Direct broadcast satellite-radio market, legal, regulatory, and business considerations by Sood, Des R.
iw
A//5#- O__-/ Tc;?J
/x.¢"
DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE - RADIO
MARKET, LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND
BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS
SUMMARY
PREPARED FOR:
NASA LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
CONTRACT NO. NAS3-25083; TASK ORDER 5
NASA PROJECT
MANAGERS
Mr. James E. Hollansworth
Ms. Ann O. Heyward
VOA PROJECT MANAGER
Dr. H. Donald Messer
PREPAREDBY
i
CONTEL FEDERAL SYSTEMS
GOVERNMENT NETWORKS GROUP
15000 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly, Virginia 22021
Dr. Des R. Sood
MARCH 1991
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910011077 2020-03-19T18:34:25+00:00Z
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank representatives of international broadcasters who
provided much needed material and valuable insight into the international
broadcasting listenership pr0fiIes and cost structures.
Special thanks are due to the NASA Project Managers, Mrl James E. Holiansworth
and Ms. Ann 0. Heyward, and the Voice of America Project Manager, Dr. H. Donald
Messer, for providing direction and guidance for this study.
w
w
i
B
n
m
=z
!
Q
m
i
i
I
m
U
I
J
I
I
m
L PREFACE
This document was prepared by Contel Federal Systems and its subcontractors for
the NASA Lewis Research Center under Task Order 5 of the Contract NAS3-25083.
Under this contract, Contel Federal Systems provides technical support to NASA for
the assessment of the future markets for Satellite Communications Services. Task
Order 5, the results of which are reported in this and two companion volumes,
addressed the marketing, organizational, legal and regulatory considerations
underlying the launch and operation of a Direct Broadcast Satellite-Radio System.
The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and not of their
organizations, or of NASA or VOA.
V
w
m
m_nn
i
i..-
n
nil
atom
nil
'n
mv
m
¥
L_
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE PAGE
SECTION 1 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
...................................... -1
STUDY OVERVIEW ...................................... 1-1
MAJOR FINDINGS ...................................... 1-2
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............... 1-14
DOCUMENT OVERVIEW ............................... 1-15
SECTION 2 - DEMAND FOR IMPROVED AUDIO SERVICES ................... 2-1
2.1 CONSUMER ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOUND QUALITY ........ 2-1
2.2 EXPERIENCE WITH FM RADIO, COMPACT DISCS AND
OTHER TECHNOLOGIES ................................. 2-2
2.3 CONSUMER DEMAND FOR BE'I-rER SOUND QUALITY UNDER
DIFFERENT RADIO FORMATS ............................ 2-6
2.4 PRICE SENSITIVITY TO NEW CONSUMER AUDIO
PRODUCTS .......................................... 2-10
SECTION 3 - SHORTWAVE FACILITIES OPERATION COSTS ..................
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.4
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2
3-1
SHORTWAVE PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION COSTS ............ 3-1
U.S. DOMESTIC ......................................... 3-2
MISSIONARY RADIO EVANGELISM .................... 3-2
HERALD BROADCASTING ............................ 3-3
NORTH AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS ...... 3-5
RADIO CANADA INTERNATIONAL (RCl) ................ 3-5
VOICE OFAMER|CA _ : 3-6
EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS ............. 3-7
RADIO NEDERLAND ................................. 3-7
BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (BBC) ......... 3-7
AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS ............... 3-9
NIGER .............................................. 3-9
SENEGAL .......................................... 3-10
TABLEOFCONTENTS
SECTION TITLE PAGE
SECTION 3 - SHORTWAVE FACILITIES OPERATION COSTS (continued)
3.6 SHORT WAVE RADIO PROGR/_M-MING D/S=FR]B UTION
KEY COST ELEMENTS ..................................
SECTION 4- AUDIO ADVERTISING
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
3-11
....................................... -1
MARKET CATEGORIZATION ............................. 4-1
ADVERTISING MARKET SIZE ............................. 4-2
ADVERTISING RATES AND HOW THEY ARE DETERMINED ... 4-6
ADVERTISING COSTS AND HOW THEY RELATE TO
RADIO FORMATS ....................................... 4-9
SECTION 5 - LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ................. 5-1
5.1 DBS-R FREQUENCY ALLOCATION AND ASSOCIATED RADIO
REGU[ ATIONS ......................................... 5-1
5.2 STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR DBS-R SYSTEMS ......... 5-2
5.2.1 PRIVATE DBS-R SYSTEM .............................. 5-2
5.2.2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
SPONSORED SYSTEM ................................ 5-5
5.3 OBSERVATIONS ON DBS-R LEGAL AND
REGULATORYISSUI=S ..._i.__._._ ...................... 5-11
5.3.1 PRIVATE NON-TREATY ORGANIZATIONS .............. 5-12
5.3.2 TREATY ORGANIZATIONS 5-13
5.4 CONCLUSIONS FROM LEGAL AND REGULATORY
PERSPECTIVE .......................................... 5-14
SECTION 6- BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS ................................. 6-1
DBS-R MARKET NICHE .................................. 6-1
DBS-R RECEIVERS MARKET PENETRATION ................. 6-3
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ........................... 6-5
DBS-R SYSTEM TECHN(hLOGICAL FEASIBILITY .......... 6-5
SPACE SEGMENT TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ........ 6-6
GROUND SEGMENT TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ..... 6-7
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
m
m
B
v
m
m
m
m
mw
-,qa
I
m
i
m
ww
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE PAG.._._E
SECTION 6- BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS (continued)
6.3.4 DBS-R RECEIVER SEGMENT TECHNICAL
6.6
6.7
6.7.1
6.7.2
6.8.2
6.8.3
6.9
CONSIDERATIONS ................................... 6-9
DBS-R SYSTEM OPERATIONS COSTS ..................... 6-10
DBS-R AND SHORTWAVE BROADCASTING COST
COMPARISON ......................................... 6-15
MAXIMUM-MINIMUM BOUNDARY ANALYSIS ............ 6-17
ORGANIZATION CONSIDERATIONS ...................... 6-18
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MARKET
PENETRATION ..................................... 6-19
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
PROFITABILITY ..................................... 6-19
BUSINESS PROJECTIONS ................................ 6-22
SEEDING THE MARKET TO ACHIEVE SELF-PROPELLED
MARKET GROWTH ................................. 6-22
DBS-R RATE OF RETURN ............................. 6-25
QUANTITATIVE BUSINESS PROJECTIONS .............. 6-25
DBS-R SYSTEM STARTUP CONSIDERATIONS .............. 6-25
w
r
iii
iU
N,
i
i
i
Vw
SECTION 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A Direct Broadcast Satellite -Radio (DBS-R) System offersthe prospect of delivering
high quality audio broadcasts to large audiences at costs lower than or comparable to
those incurred using the current means of broadcasting, i.e.,amplitude modulation
(AM) at long wave, medium wave (MW) and shortwave (SW) frequencies, and
frequency modulation (FM) at very high frequencies (VHF). The DBS-R concept is
not new; ithas been advocated in various forms for the last 25 years. However, the
maturation of mobile communications technologies, and advances in microelectronics
and digital signal processing now make it possible to bring this technology to the
marketplace. Heightened consumer interest in improved audio quality coupled with
the technological and economic feasibilityof meeting this demand via DBS-R make it
opportune to start planning for implementation of DBS-R Systems.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Lewis Research
Center, as part of their Advanced Communications Program, and the Voice of
America (VOA), as part of their on-going efforts to improve the qua'A_,y of
international audio broadcasts, have undertaken a number of tasks to more clearly
define the technical, marketing, organizational, legal and regulatory issues
underlying implementation of DBS-R Systems. This report documents the results of
a marketing, legal, and regulatory study, and presents an assessment of the business
considerations underlying the construction, launch and operation of DBS-R Systems.
1.1 Study Overview
The DBS-R market study assessed consumer demand for improved audio services,
and developed a comparative analysis of costs of delivering audio broadcasts via
shortwave systems and a DBS-R system. The effort was focused on analysis and
assessment of the following major areas:
• Consumer demand for improved audio services.
• Audience measurement techniques and their reliability.
E
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Audio advertising market and its relation to audience size and segmentation.
u
• Cost of delivering programming via short wave facilities.
• Practical approach to bringing the DBS-R technology to the marketplace.
• Cost of delivering programming via DBS-R facilities. ................
The DBS-R legal and regulatory study examined and assessed legal, regulatory, and
organizational issues underlying the establishment and operation of DBS-R systems.
The effort was focused on analysis and assessment of the following major areas:
Legal and regulatory issues underlying the establishment of domestic and/or
non-US DBS-R systems.
• Access to DBS-Rchannels.
• _ruc.urai a_rn__i"ves for establishing DBS-R services.
Major findings of these studies are summarized below.
1.2 Major Findings
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1. Consumer Demand Trend is Towards Improved Quality Audio Products and
Services
The explosive growth of the consumer electronics market has had a profound
effect on cultivating listeners' preference for media that deliver higher audio
quality. This is evidenced by the rapid growth in the sale of compact discs (CDs),
and concomitant decline in the sale of long playing (LP) records, as well as in
migration of radio audiences from AM to FM stations. This trend has also been
fueled by the positive feedback between consumers and industry. The industry has
dramatically improved the qua!,.'ty of consumer electronics products, and at the
same time reduced prices by sha,iag the benefits of economies of scale with the
u
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wconsumer. The consumers' enthusiastic response had,and continues to have,
positive impact on this spiral.
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Internationally, the population of radio receivers is increasing. This is
particularly true in the developing countries where mass production has resulted
in the receiver prices dipping to tens of dollars. However, television (TV) is
encroaching on the erstwhile devoted radio audiences. In South America,
international broadcasters are losing audience share to emerging domestic FM
stations because of the much better audio quality delivered by FM stations vis-a-
vis short wave stations. In Eastern Europe, the situation is very fluid in the wake
of recent tumultuous political events. However, it is apparent that audiences
which regularly listened to international broadcasters for objective views may no
longer feel compelled to put up with the poor quality and reliability of the short
wave broadcasts.
The consumers all over the world have become habituated to listening to better
quality audio produc*.s and this trend is irreversible. Radio broadcasters,
domestic and international, ru,'_ the risk of losing their audiences unless the
broadcast quality improves to the extent that it is at par with, at least, static-free
AM for international and informational broadcasts and FM for music and other
cultural broadcasts.
2. DBS-R Systems are Technologically Feasible
A DBS-R System implementation requires coordinated development of space
segment, ground segment, and DBS-R receivers. These elements have been
proven in applications such as mobile communications which are technically
similar to the DBS-R service. The challenge is to meld the available technologies
into a DBS-R system, which is viable from the business perspective.
w
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The DBS-R space segment will be comprised of a number of spacecraft providing
regional and global coverage over the populated land masses. The technical
design of the DBS-R spacecraft will be primarily determined by the capacity
requirement, i.e., number of channels per spacecraft, and secondarily, by the
spectral band allocated to the DBS-R service. The spacecraft antenna size and
power requirements are directly affected by the spectral region. The antenna size
1-3
decreases and the power requirement increases as the frequency increases. At
this time, it appears that spectrum allocation for DBS-R service may be near
1,500 MHz. System concepts advocated to date envisage individual spacecraft
capacity as low as 10 channels and as high as 100 channels. A channel for this
purpose is defined as one capable of delivering audio quality comparable to AM.
In actual practice, a channelization scheme delivering audio quality ranging from
AM to CD quality would be more desirable and would offer more choices to
listeners.
m
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The lower capacity spacecraft, though more expensive in terms of unit channel
cost, is attractive from a business perspective. It not only requires, relatively
speaking, lower upfront capital investment, but also a much shorter gestation
period permitting the assets to be placed into revenue-generating service in a
period of approximately 18 months which is less than half that of a medium or
high capacity spacecraft. The cost issue is further addressed under Finding No. 4.
The DBS-R spacecraft will essentially utilize the _ame .......... 5J as already
implemented in the International Martime Satellite (IN_vLkRSAT) Crganization's
spacecraft. Therefore, the development costs and the associated technical risks
are minimal.
The DBS-R ground segment is comprised of technical facilities to: (i) monitor and
control the spacecraft, (ii) uplink broadcast signals to the spacecraft, and (iii) a
terrestrial or satellite-based DBS-R network to convey the programming material
from origination centers to uplink facilities. The ground segment will also have
administrative and business components to handle the customary business
operation functions.
Implementation of the DBS-R ground segment will benefit from many years of
operational experience accumulated by operators of satellite communications
systems. Because of the specialized nature of the satellite monitor and control
function, a business decision may have to be made to lease this service from an
established operator rather than to build and staff a dedicated facility. The
satellite monitor and control center could also serve as an uplink center. The
location of other uplink centers, and design of the DBS-R distribution network,
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E will depend upon the geographical dispersion of origination
customers' facilities.
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The DBS-R receiver segment presents a challenge. The DBS-R receiver must be
capable of receiving satellite signals inside buildings (fixed receivers), in moving
vehicles (mobile receivers), and while being carried by a person from one location
to another (portable receivers). The DBS-R signal strength must be adequate to
overcome attenuation due to buildings, trees and other topological features. The
mobile receivers are particularly subject to signal degradation due to transient
loss of direct satellite visibility while passing through tunnels, urban canyons
formed by tall buildings, or thick vegetation in rural settings. A system-level
tradeoff between the satellite power output and the receiver sensitivity will
permit system designers to specify receiver technical requirements so as to ensure
that audio quality does not degrade even under adverse conditions.
Fortuitously, the receiver technology now being developed for the cellular
rcceiver_ and the advances in digital signal processing technology held the
promi_e that DBS-R receivers can be built at a reasonable cost, in the _gc J
$100 to $300 per unit, to meet the needs of the fixed, mobile, and portable receiver
markets. Developments in Japan and Europe, particularly in Europe where the
digital receiver technology has been demonstrated in field trials, are extremely
encouraging. Recently, Stanford Telecom and CD Radio announced the
development of an innovative frequency-hopping technique to cope with the signal
fade problem, and predicted that the receiver price to consumers will be less than
$200 per unit by mid-1990s. The DBS-R receiver technology will also benefit from
the personal communication (PC) receiver technology whose goal is to provide
ubiquitous access to users to public switched networks (PSNs) on a global scale.
In short, the DBS-R receiver technology building blocks are proven, rapidly
progressing, and waiting to be integrated into a mass market consumer product.
m
3. Inherent Limitations of Current Terrestrial Broadcast Systems Preclude Audio
Quality Enhancements
The shortwave broadcast_ have traditionally relied on increasing transmitter
power and simultaneously transmitting the same programming material on three
or more frequencies to ensure signal reception reliability. The reliability is
1-5
.marginally improved, though at a great cost. But the goal of improving audio
quality and eliminating the annoying shortwave cackle remains elusive. The
local AM broadcasters are now mainly limited to news and talk show formats. The
FM broadcast quality, though far superior to the local AM broadcast quality, has
no room for enhancement ..........
DBS-R System Can Deliver Programming More Cost Effectively Than Shortwave
Systems
The DBS-R and shortwave systems are comparable because both cover large
regions, generally 100,000 to 200,000 square miles in area. The wide area
coverage needs are better addressed by satellites. However, this is not a
limitation on satellite technology. By using spot beams, the DBS-R coverage on a
single beam could be restricted to a country of the size of France (roughly 200,000
square miles). For the purpose of cost comparison, we have assumed three degree
beams providing geographical coverage comparable to some of the largest
targeted shortwave systems. It may be instructive to note parenthetically that
four 3-degree bemns _,,n cover the eu*_lre Continental United States excluding
Alaska and Hawaii.
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The major cost elements that contribute to the day-to-day operations cost of
distributing programming material over shortwave facilities are: power, labor,
equipment and building maintenance, and building and land lease. The costs
vary a great deal from one region to the other because of variations in the cost of
power and labor. Table 1-1 shows the cost spectrum. Note that the international
broadcasters typically broadcast the same programming material on three
different frequencies. Therefore, the cost per program hour is three times the cost
per transmitter hour.
W
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It should be noted that the shortwave facilities operations cost shown in Table 1-1
do not reflect the depreciation expense, and cost of money because the capital
expenditures for the shortwave facilities are usually written off.
The comparable operations costs for DBS-R System° with capacities of 15, 45 and
105 AM-quality channels are shown in Table 1-2. Each system is configured to
provide 15 three-degree beams and can cover an area as large as the continent of
1-6
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Table 1-2
DBS-R System Operation Costs
SYSTEM CAPACITY
(NUMBER OF PROGRAMS OR CHANNELS)*
15 CHANNELS
(LOW)
SPACECRAFT
CHARACTERISTICS
Beginning of Life Weight (Kg)
RF Power Requirement (W)
Solar Power Requirement (W)
CAPITAL COSTS
Spacecraft and Launch Vehicle ($M)
Capitalized Interest ($M)
Launch Insurance ($M)
rechmcal Facilities ($M)
Startup Cost ($M)
Total Capital Cost ($M)
OPERATIONS AND
MAINTENANCE
(O&M) COSTS/YEAR)
Technical Operations ($M)
(Satellite Control & Uplink Centers)
On-Orbit Insurance ($M)
General & Administrative (G&A) ($M)
TOTAL O&M COST/YR ($M)
O&M Cost per Channel per hour ($)
(66% duty cycle)
i i illl ii
410
68
478
56
6
14
3
3
82
2.0
6.6
76
45 CHANNELS
(MEDIUM)
510
203
1,085
70
16
14
5
5
110
3.0
9.2
35
105 CHANNELS
(HIGH)
711
476
2,300
90
20
18
7
142
5.0
13.8
23
*AM quality channels (32Kbps).-Notethat O_M cost per channel per hour for a
higher quality channel scales directly in termsofthe data rate ratios. For example,
FM-mono channel (48 Kbps) cost is 1.5 times that of an AM channel (32 Kbps) cost.
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Africa. The 15-channel system characterized as low capacity or 'Entry System'
has the capability to simultaneously broadcast a maximum of 15 programs. The
program distribution could be one or more programs per beam as long as the
maximum number is not exceeded. The 45-channel and 105-channel systems
could be characterized as medium and high capacity, respectively, and have the
capability to simultaneously broadcast multiple programs in each beam. These
systems can reach large audiences- as does the low capacity system- but offer
considerably more choices to listeners. The channel quality can be characterized
by its data rate capacity. A DBS-R channel comparable to AM radio in quality
requires 24 to 32 Kilobits per second (Kbps) data rate capability. A CD quality
channel, on the other hand, requires data rate capability approaching 256 Kbps.
FM-mono quality channel requires 48 Kbps and FM-stereo to the tune of 128
Kbps. The channel data rate requirements can be related to power, and, hence, to
the satellite size and cost. For the purpose of cost comparison with shortwave
systems, we have assumed that the DBS-R channel quality is comparable to AM
(32 Kbps).
The spacecraft alid launch vehicle costs used in Table 1-2 are based on data
compiled by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (J'PL). The low-capacity system is
more expensive on a per channel basis than a medium capacity or a high capacity
system. However, it is believed that a low capacity system catering primarily to
the needs of core customers such as international broadcasters with some excess
capacity to allow for introduction of satellite-based domestic and regional
broadcasting offers the best option from the financial/risk perspectives. The
international broadcasters can mitigate the financial risk through outright
purchase or long-term lease guarantees. The DBS-R operator is then in a position
to obtain financing and implement a channelization scheme offering channels
varying in audio quality from AM to near-CD to CD to suit the needs of
informational and cultural broadcasters.
The DBS-R System operations and maintenance costs vary from $76 per channel
per hour for the low capacity system to $23 per channel per hour for the high
capacity system. Because of the higher quality and reliability of the DBS-R
transmissions, it is not necessary to broadcast the same material on three
different frequencies, as is the case with shortwave transmissions. Therefore, the
w
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DBS-R System O&M costs on a per program hour basis are an order of magnitude
less ($600 for shortwave versus $23 for DBS-R) than that for shortwave systems.
The O&M cost of a higher quality channel can be calculated by multiplying the
O&M cost of an A_M _quality channel by a factor equal to the rat iokof their data
rates. For example, the O&M cost of an FM-mono channel (48 Kbps) is 1.5 times
the O&M cost of an AM channel (32 Kbps). For a CD quality channel, the
multiplier is 256/32 or 8. A DBS-R operat0rroffering channels varying in quality
from AM to CD can apportion costs to channels in ratio of their data rates.
Tables 1-1 and 1'2 compare the day-totday costs:and-lgnore the depreciation and
finance costs that a private system must contend with. The shortwave facilities'
useful life is on the order of 30 years compared with the DBS-R spacecraft life
which is typically on the order of 10 years. The international broadcasters
maintain comprehensive capital improvement programs to upgrade their
facilities. For example, VOA's shortwave facilities capital improvement program
for the past 10 years has entailed expenditures of roughly $50 million to $100
million per year and is anticipated to continue at the same level for the
foreseeable future. Capital expendi_ules on this oidcr add substantially to the
real costs of delivering programming above and beyond that reflected in the day-
to-day operations costs shown in Table 1-1.
Revenue requirement projections for a privately financed and operated system,
where the capital expenditure is not written off and a reasonable rate of return is
expected on capital employed, are shown in Table 1-3. Note that the revenue
requirement on a per channel per hour basis assuming 66% utilization varies from
a high of $340 for the low capacity system to a low of $89 for the high capacity
system. The economies offered by the DBS-R System are dramatic even after all
costs, i.e., O&M, depreciation, finance charges, and profit are accounted for. The
low capacity system is attractive because it provides a quick entry into a new
market with low capital requirement and in a time frame on the order of 18
months. The high capacity system, though it requires more capital and a
gestation period on the order of 36 months, is very attractive because of increased
flexibility and very favorable revenue requirements. The business decision as to
whether to proceed with the tow or high capacity system depend_ upon an
entrepreneurial assessment of the risk, market potential, and _i,e business
environment.
1-10
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TAB LE 1-3
DBS-R SYSTEM REVENUE REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIVATE SYSTEM
DEPRECIATION COSTS/YEAR
Space Segment
(10 yrs life) ($M)
, Technical Facilities
(20 yrs life) ($M)
OTH ER COSTS/YEAR
I Cost of Money
i(15% per yr; average) ($M)
Return on Capital Employed
(18%; average) ($M)
IkEVE_UE REQUIREMENT PER
CHANNEL PER HOUR ($)
(66% duty cycle)
Depreciation Cost per Channel per
hour ($)
Other Costs per Channel per hour ($)
O&M Cost per Channel per hour ($)
(From Table 1-2)
SYSTEM CAPACITY
(NUMBER OF PROGRAMS OR CHANNELS)*
15 CHANNELS
(LOW)
7.9
0.15
6.6
8.2
93
171
76
45 CHANNELS
(MEDIUM)
10.5
0.25
8.8
11.0
41
75
35
105 CHANNELS
(HIGH)
13.5
0.35
11.4
14.2
23
43
23
TOTAL ($) 340 151 89
*AM quality channels (32 Kbps). The revenue requirement for a higher quality
channel scales directly in the ratio of data rates. See footnote to Table 1-2.
w
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Revenue requirement for a higher quality channel scales directly in the ratio of
data rates. For example, revenue requirement for an FM-mono channel (48 Kbps)
is 1.5 times the revenue requirement for an AM channel (32 Kbps). For a CD
J
quality channel, the revenue requirement is 256/32 or 8 times that of an AM
channel.
It should be noted that, as previously stated, the shortwave facilities operations
costs do not include allowances for depreciation, cost of money, or profit. Since
most of the shortwave facilities are owned and operated by either Government or
not-for-profit private entities, this practice is not questioned. For a privately-
financed and owned system, operated on commercial basis, these expenditures
account for a majority of the annual operating expenses (70% in Table 1-2).
Therefore, the real costs for distributing programming over shortwave facilities
are much higher than shown in Table 1-1.
5. DBS-R System Implementation and Operation Faces Difficult But Resolvable
_ ..._, ._=_-,,,_.._ Impediments
The DBS-R service is unique in that it must grapple with bilateral and
multilateral issues pertaining to cross border broadcasts, copyright laws, and
equitable access to DBS-R channels. The service could be offered under the
auspices of established international satellite operators such as INMARSAT or
INTELSAT to seek expedited resolution of these issues. However, under this
option, DBS-R service will neither have the priority nor the focused
organizational support that such an innovative service will require to be
successful. It is believed that privately financed and operated systems,
subscribing to common technical guidelines established by an international
organization, offer the best prospect for bringing DBS-R service to the
marketplace. The term 'private' here also refers to organizations such as the
European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT) and Arab
Satellite Consortium (ARABSAT) who might be best situated to operate regional
systems.
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) might
mandate a consortium type of structure, in the event there are several applicants
vying for a license to operate the service. The FCC may also require the operator
1-12
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to be a common carrier with access to the DBS-R channel regulated on a common
carrier basis. The broadcasters who buy or lease channels will be responsible for
the content of the programming material and will be regulated as broadcasters.
Several legal issues remain unresolved. For example, will an international
broadcaster, leasing capacity on a US DBS-R system, be subject to FCC
regulations? Could bilateral or multilateral arrangements be made to address
this issue on the basis of reciprocity? Does the US Government have an obligation
to ensure that third world countries are not deprived of access to US DBS-R
channels because of predatory pricing? Forums such as the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the United Nations Organization (UNO)
might be ideal to debate and resolve these issues.
Staged Implementation, with Capacity Matched to Demand, Offers a Sound
Business Approach to the Introduction of DBS-R Service
Satellite systems are capital-intensive, and require upfront investment over a
period of 3 to 4 years before _h_ _pacecraft is z eady for operational service. The
DBS-R service has an added challenge of stimulating production and sale of DBS-
R receivers to entice broadcasters and advertisers to try this new medium. From a
business perspective, it is critical that the upfront lead time and investment be
minimized, and an approach developed to stimulate commercial production of
DBS-R receivers.
The upfront lead time and capital investment can be minimized by starting with
an entry system whose capacity is no more than 15 channels. In terms of
spacecraft weight and power requirement, this spacecraft would be characterized
as a 'Lightsat'. Lightsat shortens the implementation lead time and reduces
capital requirement by integrating spacecraft and launch vehicle into a single
package. The entry system would be built around the requirements of core
customers such as international broadcasters to provide a solid foundation for the
business. This will also help secure financing for the project.
To stimulate commercial production of DBS-R receivers, ._ 'seed' order in
quantities of 100,000 or so may have to be placed with three or four major
manufacturers of radio receivers. The introductory DBS-R receivers might be
1-13
multi-band type offering AM, FM, terrestrial digital, and satellite digital bands.
These receivers might also find favor with automobile manufacturers for inclusion
in the medium and higher-priced models. The seed order receivers could be
distributed free or at cost to community organizations where the public would be
exposed to them and experience the difference in sound quality.
1.3 Conclusions and Recommendations
The DBS-R service is poised to redefine and revitalize the terrestrial-based radio
broadcast industry by offering consumers not only improved audio quality but also
more choice and highly specialized formats. However, translation of the DBS-R
concept into an operational reality requires progress on several fronts, namely
regulatory, spectrum management, and technical standards. The time is ripe for the
Government, the equipment manufacturers, and the radio broadcast industry to
mount a cooperative thrust to resolve underlying regulatory and technical issues.
The following recommendations are made to NASA and VOA to facilitate and
expedite this process.
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Participate in, and contribute to the US preparations for the World
Administrative Radio Conference - 1992 (WARC-92). Influence and establish
US position on the spectrum allocation for the DBS-R service.
Publicize the DBS-R technical and operational concept to private industry to
stimulate interest, and to other countries to foster cooperation in establishing
regional systems.
Continue current concept development efforts to more clearly delineate system
level trade-offs that have to be made between spacecraft and receiver technical
capabilities to optimize the system and to standardize the interfaces.
Keep abreast of the European and Pacific basin developments, particularly in
the area of digital signal processing and its potential impact on receiver
interface standards.
Undertake an experimentation program to measure propagation
characteristics in the 1.0 GHz to 2.5 GHz spectral bands under realistic
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conditions such as moving vehicles, inside buildings and tunnels, and under
thick vegetation cover. This data will enable system designers to set margin
requirements.
Explore the possibility of stimulating the launch of a privately-funded DBS-R
satellite. This approach will permit equipment manufacturers (spacecraft and
receivers) to participate in developing standards. It will also enable
broadcasters to obtain a more realistic market assessment of the DBS-R
service business potential.
1.4 Document Overview
Major findings in the areas identified under the Study Overview are summarized in
the remainder of this document. A brief synopsis is presented here.
An assessment of consumer demand for improved audio quality, as evidenced by
migration from AM to FM and the switch from LPs to CDs, is presented in Sectic, n 2.
Is is r_oLed _a_ this is a worldwide trend, and that consumer tolerance for poor sou_d
quality is rapidly diminishing as TV and other better audio quality options are
profilerating.
The factors that contribute to the cost of delivering programming material via
shortwave facilities are presented in Section 3. The costs vary a great deal from one
region of the world to other and from broadcaster to broadcaster. However, the day-
to-day cost to international broadcasters such as VOA for distributing one hour of
programming material is on the order of $600.
The potential of using a DBS-R system to offer advertisement-based broadcasts
depends upon the size of the current audio advertising market, and growth
projections over the next decade. An assessment of the audio advertising market and
per capita expenditure in different parts of the world are presented in Section 4.
DBS-R, because of its wider area coverage as compared with terrestrial-based
broadcasting systems, holds the prospect of reducing operating costs by fostering
growth of 'super stations', and increasing revenues by delivering larger, targeted,
audiences to advertisers.
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The establishment and operation of DBS-R services are contingent upon resolving
regulatory and legal issues to the satisfaction of regulatory bodies such as the FCC in
the United States. We believe that a private system operated on a common carrier
basis might find favor with the FCC. Internationally, bilateral and multilateral
arrangements may have to be negotiated to operate regional systems. The legal,
regulatory, and organizational issues are presented in Section 5.
The business considerations underlying launch and operation of DBS-R technical
facilities are addressed in Section 6. It is recognized that a rate of return
commensurate with the risk must be assured before seeking investment for this
venture. It is suggested that an 'Entry System' catering to the needs of established
broadcasters, such as international broadcasters, with some excess capacity to permit
introduction of private super stations, offers the best prospects for minimizing
upfront capital outlays and assuring a steady revenue stream.
The acronyms and abbreviations used in this document are spelled out when first
used. A list of acronyms _a ,_, , ," _;a.,,, _b, cx la_,ons is included in Appendix A.
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w SECTION 2
DEMAND FOR IMPROVED AUDIO SERVICES
Audio quality has become an important factor in consumers' preference for a radio
service. Numerous surveys conducted by, among others, international broadcasters
have established that poor sound quality is one of the major reasons for audience
migration from a given radio service. Data presented in this Section quantifies this
trend, and assesses the impact of competing media such as television (TV) and print
on the radio audiences.
2.1 Consumer Attitude Towards Sound Quality
m
With the advent of higher fidelity systems including FM, stereos, cassette players,
compact discs, and digital audio tapes (DAT), domestic and global trends are
unequivocal in that individuals are prepared to make higher investments to enjoy
better sound quality and, conversely, are growing intolerant t_ nonr sound
quality. This growing intolerance for poor reception affects most radio formats
excepting news. This exception is most pronounced in the regions of the world
where the veracity of the local news has been rendered questionable or a crisishas
arisen.
w
L =
The correlation between audience size and crises was made evident in surveys
conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and other broadcasters
in 1987, 1988 and just before the Tiananmen Square events. Even though the
survey was incomplete as a consequence of the events, the partial evidence was
conclusive with regards to the increase in both VOA and BBC audiences as a
result of the activities surrounding Tiananmen Square. Another less reliable
indication of this phenomenon is the rate at which listeners send letters to
broadcasters during times of regional crises and increased political repressions.
Despite excessive jamming of VOA and BBC broadcasts in the USSR before
"Perestroika", the audience level and listener endurance for these broadcasts were
always very high. The point is that audiences may tolerate poor sound quality
during periods of political crises or in the regions of the world where information
2-1
flow isvery strictlycontrolled. However, this is hardly conducive to cultivating
sustained audiences on a regular basis on a wider scale.
To guarantee against audience migration, international broadcasters limited to
the shortwave medium are looking for ways and means to improve the sound
quality of their broadcasts. These improvements are necessary if they are to go
beyond crises dependence to maintain the level of their audience and, more
importantly, to maintain their share of regular audiences in times of relative
tranquility.
2.2 Experience with FM Radio, Compact Discs and Other Technologies
Ongoing research by BBC, VOA, Radio France International (RFI) and others
indicates that consumer demand for improved audio service has particularly been
influenced by the newer technologies such as FM radio and CD players. These
technologies have reduced the amount of time listeners spend tuned to shortwave,
even if the actual number reached may have stayed at the sm'nc lcvel.
P, roadcasters who rely on shortwave radio for international broadcas_ _ _,ch
targets as Western Europe, South or North America do not attract many listeners
anymore. The main reason for the decline in listenership has been attributed to
the dominance of FM and mediumwave transmission capabilities in these parts of
the world. The data in tables 2-1 and 2-2 lists the regular audiences for
international radio in select African and South American countries. With the
growing implementation of FM transmitters in South America, the international
broadcasters' audience share has fallen drastically.
Another example of the impact of FM on the audience for shortwave broadcasting
can be seen on the continent of Africa. Shortwave is the main means of
transmission for international and domestic broadcasts throughout the continent;
consequently, Africa is where the audience share for shortwave is expected to be
very large. However, at both extremes of the Continent, in Egypt and South
Africa, the dominance of FM and mediumwave transmissions has considerably
lowered the use of shortwave radio. This same fact was confirmed during a
meeting we Conducted witl, broadcasters from Senegal, Tanzania, and Swaziland.
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TABLE 2-1
Regular Audiences for International Radio In Selected African
Countries Among Adults (all figures in percentages)
Source: Graham Mytton and Carol Forrester
1988
Country, date of survey &
language of listening
Africa Deutche Radio Radio S.
RFI VOA BBC
No. 1 Welle Moscow Africa
Other
Significant
Broadcasters
w
Cameroon, six towns, 1986, 59.2 27.9 11.7 3.7 2.4 1.5 n.a.
French
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, n.a. n.a. 2.3 5.4 0.5 1.5 n.a.
1987, English (Amharic)
Gabon, all urban areas, 82.0 15.0 6.0 3.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1984, French
Ghana, Accra English- (21.2) n.a. 33.2 40.0 2.8 2.0 3.4
speaking adults, 1985, French
English
Kenya, Nationwide, 1983 n.b. n.b. 1.9 3.8 18.6 1.8 3.1
SwahiIi
Mauritania, Nouakchott, ).i.3 30.7 27.5 5.3 1.1 5 n..a.
1986
French and/or Arabic
Nigeria, Nationwide, 1983
English n.a. 1.1 6.0 7.7 1.4 1.0.3 1.5
Hausa n.b. n.b. 5.4 12.94 5.56 2.4 n.b
Senegal, Dakar, 1987, 17.5 39.1 16.2 6.1 4.8 5.4 n.a.
French
Sierra, Leone, Freetown, 15.2 n.a. 20.2 37.2 2.3 3.0 n.a.
1985, English
Zaire, four to_'ns. 1984 29.1 27.3 16.1 5.8 10.6 4.7 20.1
French
Zambia, Urbah areas,
1986, English
n.a. n.a. 4.7 11.3 1.2 0.0 11.5
7.3 (ELWA)
26.8 (Radio
Tanzania)
44.5 (Radio
Seneg
1.4 (ELWA)
1.9
(ELWA)al)
2.4 (Radio
Canada)
21.6 (Liberia)
15.7 (ELWA)
26.9 (Radio
Brazzaville)
7.6 (Radio
Angola}
5.7
(Zimbabwe
B.C.)
2.0 (Malawi
B.C.)
n.a. = Not asked, n b. - no broadcast
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TABLE 2-2
Regular Audiences for International Radio In Selected South
American Countries Among Adults (all figures in percentages)
Source: Graham Mytton and Carol Forrester
1988
Radio RadioCountry, and Radio Radio Deutche Radio Canada
language of BBC VOA Nether- Moscow Welle HCJB Havana Inter- Exterior
listening lands national Espana
D
m
Radio_
France
Interm
tiona_
Argentina, 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3
Spanish
Brazil, 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.2 n.a. 0.1 0.4 n.a.
Portuguese
Chile, 3.7 2.5 0.5 1.7 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4
Spanish
Columbia, 1.I 1.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 n.a. 0.1 0.6
Spanish
Guatemala, 0.8 2.2 0.4 1.1 0.3 1.0 1.9 0.8 0.5
Spanish
Peru, 4.2 2.7 0.8 1.8 1.6 7.0 2.7 0.9 1.4
Spanish
El Salvador, 2.8 10.0 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.9 1.3 0.7 1.1
Spanish
Venezuela, 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
Spanish
0.1
0.1 _
n.a_
J
0.3
=
0.1 ::
0.4
0.2
0.0 u
n.a. -- Not asked; n.b. - no broadcast
The representative from Senegal told us that surveys conducted by his
government and international broadcasters, such as RFI, have found that the
largest audiences in French is achieved by the commercial Africa Number One
station. This is because Africa Number One has a powerful 500 KW transmitter
transmitting to particularly Francophile Africa from Gabon. The signal is much
clearer and, as a result, Africa Number One has remained one of the most popular
stations in the region.
Another example was furnished by the representative from Swaziland. The
Government and commercial stations there are in the process of converting to FM
and mediumwave stations to keep up with demand for better sound quality and to
increase their audience share.
I
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More precise surveys conducted in the United States have shown that the AM
radio audience share has progressively declined as a result of the introduction of
FM radio. The following chart (Figure 2-1) compares the relative AM and FM
audience shares in the last 16 years. The steady decline in the AM share, and
concomitant rise in the FM listenership, offers vivid testimony to the listeners'
preference for better audio qualityl .....
Today, in some parts of the U.S., consumers are paying a service fee to cable
operators for better quality digital sound. Preference for higher quality sound has
also been spurred by the advent of compact discs which has also increased
audience awareness to the benefits of high quality sound. Figure 2-2 compares the
sales of cassette tapes and vinyl records with that of compact discs during the
period 1983 to 1989. The data is clear with regard to the continued growth of CD
Figure 2-1
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Figure 2-2
Comparative Sales of Cassettes, CDs and Records
in the United States
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sales demonstrating both the consumer preference and demand for better quality
sound.
m
Other technologies that have adversely affected radio listening time are television
and video. Figures 2-3 through 2-5 summarize the loss of audiences to television
in Bangladesh, Brazil and Uruguay. In most cases, besides the visual component
of television and Video, the poor sound quality of the existing radio transmission
services have also been given as reasons for audience migration.
2.3 C_.pnsumer demand for better sound ualit under different radio formats
Interviews conducted with various broadcasters and radio audience-preference
researchers have indicated that the demand for better sound quality is more
pronounced with certain radio formats that with others. Generally, as would be
2-6
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Figure 2-3
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expected, it has been determined that the demand for better sound quality is less
acute for all-news, talk and sports radio formats. Indeed, a good majority of the
domestic and international audience for AM and shortwave is often focused on
news, sports and talk radio formats.
Music radio formats have shown an increasing demand for higher audio sound
quality. Examples include pop music, rock, jazz, instrumental, easy listening and
other variety formats.
The classification or definition of the various radio formats changes with the
evolution of the broadcast industry. Table 2-3 shows the US radio station
population by format.
2.4 Price sensitivity to new consumer audio products
A reasonable basis for the penetration analysis of new audio products, in general,
and the Direct Broadcast Satellite receivers, in particular, is the historical
development of the radio ana _,elevisivn r_ce_ver markets.
Since 1955, the sale of radios continued to climb in tandem with the world's
population in the Third World but has outstripped population growth in both the
Developed and the erstwhile Communist World. The same trend is evident in the
TV sales around the world since its commercial introduction in 1960.
Figures 2-6 through 2-9, demonstrate the trend in both TV and radio sales
worldwide. In each case, the sales are plotted against population growth. In the
Developed World, sales in Radio and TV have continued to rise both dramatically
and faster than the population growth (See Figures 2-6 and 2-7).
Note that the same trend in the more industrialized countries was also evident in
the erstwhile Communist Bloc even though the disposable income in the latter
group was significantly lower than the countries in Western Europe, North
America and some countries in Asia. For both radio and TV, growth in ownership
has continued to rise ahead of population all the way through 1990.
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Table 2-3
US Radio Station Population by Format
Format Commercial
Adult Contemporary 2,104
Adult Standards 361
Album Progressive 39
Album Rock 255
Classic Rock 88
Contemporary Hits 892
Country 2,451
Easy Listening 294
Ethnic 35
Fine Arts 52
Jazz and New Age 40
News and Talk 360
Oldies 627
R&B, Urban Contemp. 298
Religious Contemporary 99
Religion and Gospel 608
Spanish 297
Unknown or changing 171
formats
Variety =... 131
Total 9,202
156 stations are silent.
760 construction permits are pending.
Non-Commercial
16
1
225
11
1
71
7
7
10
283
110
66
0
33
34
330
25
91
374
1,695
Source: The M Street Journal, 1990
k
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FIGURE 2-6
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FIGURE 2-8
Radio Ownership and Population (/4)
in the Third World
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When we look at the trends for TV in the developed and erstwhile Communist
Bloc (Figure 2-7), we seea dramatic increase in line with radio sales supporting
the view that consumers are not only prepared but also able to spend even more
money for broadcast receivers depending on sound and visual qualities as well as
the variety of choiceswhich these receivers will deliver.
The same analysis holds fairly well for Third World markets. Figures 2-8 and 2-9
show the radio and TV ownership and population over a period of 35 years. In
both cases, the trend in receiver acquisitions has risen in tandem with the
population and just as dramatically.
It is apparent from data presented in Figures 2-6 through 2-9 that although
disposable income may strongly influence consumers' audio and video products
purchase decisions, the need and desire for information and entertainment are
equally strong factors. This bodes well for the Direct Broadcast Satellite-
Receivers market. It is anticipated that consumers would be enthusiastic about it
as they have be_n with the other consumer electronicsproducts.
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SECTION 3
SHORTWAVE FACILITIES OPERATION COSTS
In this section, we look at the costs incurred in distributing radio programs via
shortwave facilities. In collecting and analyzing this data, we selected shortwave
broadcasters from the U.S. (domestic), North America, Europe and Africa. The
spread of stations enabled us to perform a comparative analysis of major components
that contribute to the cost of distributing radio programming via shortwave facilities.
3.1 Short Wave Program Distribution Costs
In our more focused research, we have found that costs of distributing
shortwave programming is a function of location, the number of hours of
operation and two more important variables, namely power and personnel.
The VOA's estimate for operating costs range from $100-$200 per transmitter
hour depending on the number of hour_ of operation and the number of crew
shifts required. Other estimates are as low as $60 per transmitter hour. Our
own focused research has yielded similar results with only a few exceptions.
To make the analysis of shortwave program distribution costs more
manageable, we focused on the following broadcasters in terms of their present
costs of operating shortwave radio programming distribution facilities.
U.S. Domestic
Missionary Radio Evangelism
Herald Broadcasting (Christian Science Monitor)
North American Broadcasters
Radio Canada International (RCI)
Voice of America
3-1
European Broadcasters
Radio Nederland
British Broadcasting Corporation
African Broadcasters
t
m
3.2
3.2.1
Radio Senegal
Radio Niger
U.S. Domestic
Missionary Radio Evangelism
Missionary Radio Evangelism operates a 50 kW transmitter out of E1 Paso,
Texas, for a variable broadcast schedule in a given day or week. The targets
for the station are Eastern parts of the Soviet Union and thc Far East. Thc
cost _rc,_kdowns on a yearly basis are as follows:
_.$_.. %
Power $28,000 40%
Labor 28,000 40%
Other 14_000 20%
Total $70,000 100%
m
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The costs of Missionary Radio Evangelism are very low compared to other
stations we studied. In discussions with the operators of the station, we were
told that the main reason costs are kept low is (i) power costs are low, (ii) there
is much volunteer labor, and (iii) the hours of transmission are also as low as 6
hours per day, five days a week. Given a non-variable transmission of 6 hours
per day, five days a week, the total transmission hours in a year would be
1,560. Divided into the total transmission costs for distributing shortwave
programming, this yields $44.87 per hour of transmission.
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3.2.2 Herald Broadcasting
Herald Broadcasting Corporation, funded by the Christian Science Monitor,
has three shortwave facilities in Saipan, Maine and South Carolina. Each of
these shortwave stations broadcasts for 20 hours a day on weekdays and 24
hours a day on weekends. Target audiences are worldwide from Japan,
Taiwan, Hong Kong and China to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The
facility in Saipan consists of two 100 kW transmitters; the one in Maine is a
500 kW transmitter; and the facility in South Caroline consists of two 500 kW
transmitters. The costs are broken down below per site. The operating costs
for the Saipan stations are as follows:
KHBI Saipan, Northern Marianna Islands Operating Costs
_.$._ %
Power $ 500,000 50%
Labor 170,000 17%
O_hCr 330,000 33%
Total $1,000,000 100%
Note that Saipan broadcasts for 148 hours a week, or 7,696 hours a year.
Therefore, the operating cost per transmitter hours is $130. Also note that the
facility in Saipan has two 100 kW transmitters, whereas the Missionary Radio
Evangelism has only one 50 kW transmitter.
The operating costs for the Maine facility are as follows:
WCSN, Scotts Corner, Maine
_k_
Power $ 200,000
Labor 390,000
Other 510,000
Total $1,100,0GC
%
18.2%
35.5%
46.3%
100%
3-3
The operating cost per hour for the Maine facility is $143. Note that the Maine
facility has one 500 kW transmitter, whereas the Saipan facility has two
100 kW transmitters. However, the power cost for the Maine facility, instead
of being higher, is 40% of the power cost for the Saipan facility. The variability
in the power rates across the United States and the world is a major
contributor to the variability in the station operation costs.
w
w
The cost breakdown for the South Carolina facility is as follows: J
WSH_B, Cypress Creek, South Carolina
._$.._ %
Power $ 170,000 13.6%
Labor 500,000 40.0%
Other 580,000 46.4%
Total $1,250,000 100%
The operating cost per hour tbr the South Cdfoli,_a faciiicy is $162. Although
the South Carolina facility has two 500 kW transmitters, the power costs are
relatively low. Almost 50% of the operating cost for the Saipan facility, which
has only two 100 kW transmitters, is contributed by power, whereas for the
South Carolina facility with 5 times the transmitter power of Saipan, cost of
power is only 13.6%. Power and labor are the two most important factors
affecting costs, and also the ones that are extremely variable from one facility
to the other. A summary of the operating costs for the Herald Broadcasting
facilities is presented below.
Maine
South Carolina
Saipan
$125.9 i/transmitter hour
$143.09/transmitter hour
$114.47/transmitter hour
In comparing the three facilities which Herald Broadcasting runs, we can see
how operating costs are a function of location and that the largest of the
variables relate to costs of power and labor. In the Saipan fac'Hty, 50% of
Herald Broadcasting's transmission costs are for power; but only 17% of the
total budget is for labor costs. On the other hand, power costs in the U.S.
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facilities range from 13.6% in South Carolina to 18.2% in Maine. However, the
labor costs in the U.S. are comparatively much higher ranging from 35.5% in
Maine (to run one transmitter) to 40% in South Carolina to run a two-
transmitter site.
3.3
The total costs to Herald Broadcasting for distributing shortwave
programming is approximately $3,350,000. Total hours of transmission in
these facilities run at 23,088 hours per year. This yields an average cost of
$145.09 per transmitter hour to distribute shortwave programming.
North American International Broadcasters
3.3.1 Radio Canada International (RCI)
RCI runs several facilities in Canada and elsewhere ranging in size from 100
kW to 250 kW transmitters. Targets for RCI are worldwide. Its size is
comparable to that of the government funded _hortwave broadcastc_ in
_eden or Switzerland, and like both, RCI broadcasl,_ abuul, o40 hc, u,_ per
week or a total of 12,480 hours of programming annually. The international
broadcasters usually broadcast the same material on three different
frequencies to ensure reception by the target audience. Therefore, each
programming hour is multiplied by three to derive the actual transmitter
hours. Its various studio and transmission facilities are linked by satellite.
The breakdown of costs for distributing shortwave radio programming for RCI
is as follows:
Canadian $ %
Power $ 900,000 19.4%
Labor 2,000,000 30.4%
Other :: 3,674,000 50.2%
Total $6,432,000 100%
Note that the power costs are even less in Canada than in the U.S. While
19.4% of _,'._e total budget is spent on power, the overall output of RCI is much
higher than the facilities discussed above. Labor costs are higher as are the
"Other" category costs. These are high for RCI because the buildings which
3-5
3.3.2
house the facilities are rental and there are also additional costs for other
communications related (satellite, HF) transmissions. Dividing the total
transmission hours annually (37,440) into the total transmission costs renders
the per transmitter hour costs for RCI at $171.79 Canadian Dollars or $142.12
U.S. Dollars.
Voice of America
VOA is one of the biggest international shortwave broadcasters, the others
include Radio Moscow and Radio Beijing. VOA transmits in excess of 6,000
transmission hours per week which translates to approximately 300,000
transmission hours annually. VOA runs a number of facilities varying in size,
number and types of transmitters. Its various studios and transmission
facilities are connected by satellite/HF links.
The breakdown of costs for distributing shortwave radio programming for
VOA is as follows:
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$ %
Power $11 million 19.4%
Labor 24 million 30.4%
Other 23.5 million 50.2%
Total $58.5 million 100%
The average (mean) power costs for VOA's worldwide facilities run
approximately 10¢ per kW hour, more than double the Canadian costs. Note
also the budget for labor is very high for VOA. Dividing total transmission
hours into total cost yields $187.50 per hour as the cost of transmitting
shortwave radio programming for VOA. Since VOA typically broadcasts the
same program on three different frequencies, the cost of broadcasting 1 hour of
programming material is $562.50.
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3.4.1
European International Broadcasters
Radio Nederland
Radio Nederland is one of the larger-sized international broadcasters with
several facilities in Holland and elsewhere the largest of which is on the Flevo
Polder consisting of four 500 kW shortwave transmitters. Like the other major
broadcasters, Radio Nederland also transmits to a worldwide radio audience.
Radio Nederland transmits a total of 176,477.5 transmitter hours per year and
has in excess of 350 employees.
The total cost of distributing shortwave programming for Radio Nederland
breaks down as follows:
3.4.2
Power $ 7,700,000 22.2%
Labor 21 A, Q ,7o,7 61.8%
Other 5,5_1,213 16.0%
Total $34,680,000 100%
While the power costs for Radio Nederland are low, the highest cost is labor
representing in excess of 62% of the total budget. Dividing the total budget by
the total transmission hours, the price of distributing shortwave programming
comes out to approximately $196.50 per hour for Radio Nederland.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
The BBC runs several facilities in the U.K. and other places equipped with
transmitters ranging in size from 100 to 500 kW with different configurations
(numbers, types) at each site. The BBC is one of the larger broadcasters
competing in Europe with Deutche Welle in size and costs of operations. The
BBC operations encompass a total of about 208,000 transmission hours
annually.
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The breakdown of costs for distributing shortwave radio programming for the
BBC is as follows:
Power $ 20,800,000 52.8%
Labor 11,350,000 28.8%
Other 7,270,000 18.4%
Total $39,420,000 100%
m
W
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In our own focused research, we found that the BBC is among a few
broadcasters that pay such a high price for power. In excess of 50% of the
budget is spent on power alone, but other costs are comparatively much lower.
The cost of distributing shortwave programming for the BBC's worldwide
services comes out at $189.52 per hour.
BBC was also asked if they had cost informat_.on on a ow_,,l_ target region, as
opposed to their worldwide costs. The following is BDC'_ arproxi:,m_e cost mr
transmitting shortwave programming to Africa and the Middle East.
The Africa and Middle East Region is served by three BBC facilities on
Ascension Island, Seychelles Island and Cyprus. The facility on Seychelles
Island is dedicated to cover East and Southern Africa. The other two, on
Ascension and Cyprus, cover other parts of Africa and the Middle East, among
other places. The cost figures that were obtained are the pro rata costs for
transmitting shortwave programming to Africa and the Middle East only.
Note that the costs for power in all three locations are around 50% of total
transmission costs. Labor costs vary from 22% to 35%. The other costs, which
include satellite transmission costs as well as maintenance, also vary slightly
from location to location.
Looking at the total hours of transmission in each location, we calculated the
follv_,ing hourly costs for each location:
em
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ASCENSION
ss
Power S2_9J_OOM
Labor S1_S2J_OOM
Other $1_9_OOM
Total $4,900_S00M
Transmission
Hours
48.1%
29.6%
22.3%
100%
72 t'nlclay
SEYCHELLES
SS
SI,4,52,000 53.4%
$ 598,950 22.0%
S 671,,550 24.6%
S2,722,500 100%
4OI,m/day
CYPRUS
SS
S1,452j330 47.1%
S1_89_0 35.3%
,m,
S 544£00 17.6%
S,3,085,500100%
,m
38h_ck_,
TOTAL
SS __
S5263,,500 49.2%
S 3,139,950 29.3%
S 2,.,'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'._5,05021.5%
S10,708,S00 100%
147 hrs/cKw
Ascanslon Islard_,
Seychelles Islands
Cyprus
$186.47 per hour
186.47 per hour
251.53 per hour
The total shortwave transmissions into Africa and the Middle East are
approximately 147 hours per day. The cost of transmitting shortwave
programming into this region therefore comes out to about $199.58 per hour.
Note also that the costs of transmitting to Africa and the Middle East
constitute over one-fourth of the total budget of BBC's worldwide service.
3.5 African International Broadcasters
3.5.1
The government of Niger runs a 20 kW facility in Niame and a 500 kW facility
in Korodou. The transmis=ion hours are far fewer when compared to the
international broadcasters anaiyzed above, but comparable to the 50 kW
facility of Missionary Radio.
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The cost breakdown for Niger are as follows:
$ %
Power $118,000 54.6%
Labor 26,300 12.2%
Other 71,606 33.2%
Total $215,906 100%
w
Even though the overall cost for transmission is low compared to other
broadcasters, we were told that the highest component of costs is power related
taking up in excess of 54% of the overall budget.
The Niger stations transmit about 6-7 hours per day, for a total of about 2,548
transmission hours per year. The cost for distributing shortwave
programming for Niger, therefore, comes out to about $84 per hour.
3.5.2 Senegal
In our interview with the Chief of Transmissions for Radio Senegal, we were
told the government funds the operation of a 100 kW transmitter in Dakar.
The station operates approximately 10 hours per day and targets the border
countries in the region.
The cost breakdown for the shortwave radio station in Senegal is as follows:
$ %
Power $ 79,000 42.9%
Labor 39,500 21.4%
Other 65,800 35.7%
Total $184.300 100%
I
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Note again that while overall costs are low for bnth the radio stations in
Senegal and Niger, it is not clear to what extent go,crnment subsidies have
depressed the cost breakdown shown above. However, the major cost elements
are both power and labor. In Senegal in particular, labor costs are higher
3-10
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reflecting a higher wage structure. Power costs represent almost 43% of the
total budget.
Given a 10 hour per day transmission, the total cost for distributing shortwave
programming in Senegal is $50.63 per hour.
w
3.6 Short Wave Radio Programming Distribution Key Cost Elements
Table 3-1 summarizes shortwave facilities operations cost data. A perusal of
the cost data for the domestic and foreign broadcasters shows that power and
labor are the key elements that contribute most heavily to the day-to-day costs
for operating shortwave transmitter facilities. The 'other' category includes
cost elements such as building and equipment maintenance, facility lease
charges, and the costs associated with delivering the programming material to
transmitter site (s), usually via satellite. Here, we present a qualitative
picture of the programming distribution costs and the reasons for their
variability from one region to the other.
The major cost elements which contribute to the costs of distributing
shortwave radio programming can be categorized as capital and operation and
maintenance (O&M) costs. The capital costs pertain to expenditures on such
items as antenna, transmitters, and attendant equipment complement. The
capital cost may also include cost of land, land improvements, buildings and
the equipment installation costs. The O&M costs include the ongoing
expenditures associated with O&M of the transmitter facility and are
composed of elements such as the following:
• Power (fuel) costs
• Buildinglease/up-keep costs
• Generalmaintenance costs
• Labor costs
3-11
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m Other related costs with regional and trans-oceanic transmissions are costs
associated with the communications link (satellite/HF, etc.) to achieve
stronger signal re-broadcasts to target regions.
Cost structures for shortwave broadcasting are difficult to generalize because
of the number of variables that are introduced in accounting and system
implementation approaches, as well as the differences in power and equipment
costs from country to country. In the interviews held with various
broadcasters from different parts of the world, we found an additional cost
differential resulted if the broadcaster was dependent on another entity (e.g.
FTT) to operate the transmission system. Transmission costs are sometimes
inflated two to three times in countries where the transmitter operation is
undertaken by entities other than the broadcasters. Similarly, power costs in
places such as the UK are very high, constituting about 50% of the total
transmission costs. In other places such as Canada, power represents a
fraction as low as a fifth of total transmission costs.
A number of tactucs coi,trlbute tc the costs of installation of a shortwave
transmission capability. These include the costs of the transmitters, antennae,
cables, central circuitry, RF switching matrix, and other attendant equipment.
To ensure flexibility, normally, at least three (3) antennas per transmitter are
installed. There is also a need to locate a reliable power source from the public
utilities, or on-site generators may have to be provided. Another cost factor is
the need for a fair acreage of land to construct the transmitter and antennae
sites. For a medium size site containing anywhere from six to seven
transmitters, up to 300 acres of land may be required without including the
additional acreage needed for a buffer zone to eliminate hazards. Interviews
with various broadcasters from the BBC, Voice of American, Radio Canada
and Radio Nederlands have indicated that the estimated cost for setting-up a
"virgin" site is in the order of $20 to $25 million per transmitter; a site
containing six transmitters could therefore cost anywhere from $120 to $150
million.
The power costs, as previously stated, vary flom country to country, and,
obviously, depend on the cost of electricity and fuel in a given country.
Another factor that affects power costs is the efficiency of the transmitter. We
3-13
were told that the best transmitters today areabout 60% to 67% efficient. Cost
of power around the world varies from 0.05¢ to 0.25¢ per kilowatt hour.
The cost of construction of the site is also a variable that changes from region
to region depending on the climatic conditions. Radio Canada's antenna
structure, for example, has to be twice as large to "pack" sufficient weight, so
that it is not affected by the worst icing conditions. The antenna structure in a
hot climate area, on the other hand, is less cumbersome and, therefore, less
costly.
Building up-keep relates to the normal costs associated with running
industrial sites including the maintenance of safety features and having the
proper tools and safeguards to fight fire hazards.
The major maintenance cost associated with shortwave broadcasting is the
replacement of transmitter parts such as the tubes, blocking condensers,
mechanical aspects (the gears and moving parts associated with the running of
dynamic operations) and other preventive types cfmalntenanc_.
Finally, an equally important cost element in running shortwave broadcasting
is the labor cost for the technical, administrative and other (security, etc.)
staff. Again, there is a large variable in these costs. The amount of time the
transmitters are running, salary rates of the given country in which the
station is operating and even the management philosophy are all factors that
vary both the labor pool and costs associated with distributing shortwave radio
programming domestically, regionally and globally.
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mSECTION 4
AUDIO ADVERTISING
This Section examines the radio advertising market in selected countries/regions of
the world and describes how radio advertising rates are set. This information would
be of interest for gauging the revenue potential of a DBS-R System catering to the
needs of commercial broadcasters.
4.1 Market Categorization
The radio advertising market is directly linked to the area population, i.e., the
size of the market. Thus, a radio market could be classified differently in
different countries or regions but would generally fall under some population-
related designation. For example, a "Major Market" may, in a given country,
be defined as an area with a population of 500,000 or more inhabitants; a
._ocendary market may encompass an area with, say 200_00¢ plu._ inhabitaDt._:
a tertiary market may be designated as an area with less than 200,000
inhabitants; and, finally, a non-competitive market may be described as
having a population of less than 60,000 or, even a larger population but with
too many radio stations competing for the same market thereby excessively
fragmenting the total audience reach of any one station.
Audience information obtained from audience measurement data is matched
against product buying data. Stations whose ratings show that they can and
have reached an audience that matches the profile of a market for a given
product are selected for advertising that product.
As an example, suppose an automobile manufacturer wants to advertise a
given car model. The first step in analyzing the radio advertising market in
this case would be to analyze the automobile market, its size as well as the
buyer profile (who buys, when and where). The next step would be to analyze
the type of radio format most likely to appeal or to match the buyer profile for
the industry as well as the specific model. Data from radio audience
measurements which categorize the radio audience in terms of various
4-1
demographic and psychographic categories would yield information on the
radio format that would appeal to the target audience. Based on this
information, the stations that provide that type of format in the target region
are selected and an advertising "package" developed accordingly. The success
often depends on the degree to which the radio audience data has been cross
tabulated with the product usage information.
m
V
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4.2 Advertising: Market Size
Figure 4-1 compares the actual dollar expenditures on radio advertising in
nine developed countries using 1988 figures. The figure also indicates the
percentage which radio advertisements represented out of the total
advertising expenditure for the year 1988.
Figure 4-2 shows the breakdown of advertising expenditures in four different
countries between outdoor and cinemas; radio, TV, magazines, and the press.
Note the co,-gnan elements between the countries analyzed in all cases: TV
and the pie_s a_tract thc largest expenditures ranging from 33% to 45%. The
differences are in the role radio and magazines play in the different countries.
m
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There are significant common elements between the countries analyzed: TV
enjoys around a third of all advertisement revenues, and press attracts 40-45%
in each case. The main differences between countries relate to the roles of
radio, magazines (here including business/professional publications), and
cinema and outdoor advertising. The role of cinema and outdoor advertising is
very minor.
m
z
Table 4-1 presents radio listening from the advertising perspective in four
different countries: Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. and USA. The data and
associated notes 1-6 compare radio usage, listening time, commercial station's
shares and the commercial radio reach for these countries.
At the end of 1988, the US had almost 10,000 commercial radio stations while
Australia had 141 and the U.K. 44. Of Australia's 141, thirty-four were in the
five mainland state capitals. Australia and the U.S. have multi-commercial
station markets.
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Figure 4-1
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Figure 4-2
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Radio continues to account for a smaller volume of advertising expenditures
than do print and television. Table 4-2 shows the radio advertising
expenditures for Brazil and countries included in Figure 4-1. It may be
interesting to note that only eight countries reported radio expenditures of
more than $200 million, and only two others reported a radio budget of $100
million or over. The global radio advertising budget is estimated to be
approximately $1.5 billion.
Per capita • adio expenditures in 1988 were over ten dollars in seven countries
and exceeded five dollars in six other nations. Table 4-3 shows the per capita
expenditures.
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Radio Listening
(At end of 1988)
SOURCE: Media Measurements in Australia, David Jones Communications
Research Services
1 2 3 4 5 6
(See notes below) I wk 2 wks
Australia
5 main capitals
(5 capital cities include about 60% of total Aust. pop.)
18% 22 hrs 84% 50% 86% 41% 60%
United States 16% 21 hrs
All markets 18% 23 hrs
Top 10 cities 18% 22 hrs
100 cities 18% 22 hrs
95% 22% 95% 35% 60%
95% 28% 95% 50% 71%
m
Ur, ited Kingdom
All 43 markets 15% 19 hrs 31% 31% 43% 35% 50%
New Zealand
All markets 20% 25 hrs 87% 70% 86% 48% 72%
m
Notes:
1. People using radio in the average of 1/4 hour 6 am to midnight expressed as a
percent of potential. Australia PPL 10 + ; USA PPL 12 +, U.K. PPL 15 +, N.Z.
PPL 10 +. (PPL Stands for people)
2. Time spent listening is the weekly average for all people (including non-
listeners).
All commercial share is the combined total of all commercial stations.
Share top 3 stations indicates the combined share of the top 3 commercial
stations.
Total commercial reports the combined weekly commercial radio reach.
Schedule reach indicates an approximate reach for a gross schedule per week
over one week and after four weeks.
.
4.
.
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Table 4-2
m
1988 Advertising Expenditures for Radio
Country_ (In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
United States $7,798.0
1,466.3
. }aPan .... : ....
Canada 553.3
Spain 525.4
France 497.7
Germany, Fed. Rep. 451.4
Australia 305.3
United Kingdom 247.6
BraziI 184.5
Italy - 175.2
SOURCE: FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIAN RADIO BROADCASTERS
As a proportion of total measured media advertising expenditures, radio
trailed considerably behind both print and television. Radio accounted for
more than twenty percent of the total measured media in only four countries as
shown in Table 4-4.
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Note that the percentage of advertising dollars spent on radio is much less for
U.S., Japan, and European countries (see Figure 1) than for less developed
countries as shown in Table 4-4. _
n
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4.3 Advertising Rates and How They are Determined
J
Radio advertisement rates are primarily driven by ratings in the developed
world. Audience measurement organizations such as Arbitron, Birch
4-6
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Table 4-3
1988 Per Capita Radio Advertising Expenditures
SOURCE: Marketing Pulse, New York (Private Communication)
Country (In U.S. Dollars)
United States $31.8
New Zealand 24.2
Canada 21.2
Australia 18.5
Spain 13.5
Austria 12.3
Japan 12.0
Puerto Rico 9.7
France 8.9
Germany, Fed. Rep. 7.3
Finland 6.5
Israel _ 6.5
Ireland 6.0
Scarborough or BBM develop station reports or ratings which estimate the
number of people listening to the station for some time segment (usually for a
quarter of an hour). The audience measurement data can be categorized in
many ways. The categories could be socio-economic or demographic.
The measured audience is normally translated into time periods (quarter hour,
half hour, etc.), providing information on how many and what types of
listeners tuned into a given station at a designated hour. The information
could be cumulative or broken down into certain demographic categories. It
could also provide information as to where such listening took place (car, home,
other, etc.).
The data would also provide pertinent information on the audience profile.
The characteristics (work status, occupation, sex of head of household,
education, household size, media equipment owned, etc.) would define the total
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Table 4-4
Percent of 1988 Measured Media Advertising
Expenditures Allocated to Radio
SOURCE: Marketing Pulse, New York (Private Communication)
:
COUNTRY
Dominican Republic 28.5%
Jamaica 26.6%
Guatemala 24.4%
Trinidad and Tobago 21.2%
audience in terms of the types of persons reached and times so reached. The
station report would include total hours comprising the total listening to a
station in a week; the station's share of weekly hours given as a percentage of
all the hours spent listening by the total population within the reach of the
_,,_,_,,,_*_*;_""and the average weekly hours which show the average tim_ a pc,_on
",-,u_,ld hd\'c L_ned 1:,Co the station in that week.
Based on the analyses of these data, a radio market profile is developed by
station and by radio format. The rating is used by an advertiser to determine
which station would be best qualified to target his audience.
The station in turn would develop nominal prices for the different segments of
the radio station's program hours. However, the actual prices for a 5 to 60
second time or "spot" especially in the U.S. is sold almost in an auction type of
an environment: the station may start at its ratings-determined nominal
price, but the paid price would be determined by, among other things, the
following factors:
@
@
The number of spots sold;
The number of spots remaining;
What other stations are charging;
When the "program" is _oing on the air;
The day of the week (more on Friday than Monday);
The radio format, etc.
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mIn so far as the ratings of a station and the product profile are the main
determinants for the time and spot rate classifications, we can be certain that
an advertiser's objective in placing a radio advertisement is to reach an
anticipated audience; and the basis for developing the spot or time rate is
predicated on the number and profile of the listeners involved.
Tables 4-5, 4-6 and 4-7 compare the time spot rate classification between two
radio companies in the U.S. and one in Tokyo. Note that in Table 4-5 the
various rates are presented in a descending order of rates depending on the
time availability. Thus, for example, if an advertiser wishes to go on the air on
short notice between 5:30- 10:00 am (classified as AAA for WHUR) and the
radio station is forced to preempt another customer, the rates are determined
under Grid 1. Conversely, if the time slots have not been sold, the grid level for
determining the spot rates may be either 8, 9 or 10.
Table 4-6 provides a basis for comparing the audio market between stations in
different cities. Note that the rate for the morning "spot" on the popular KYW
Radio of Philadelphia is more tha,: double tim afternoon rates, although both
rates are justified on the basis that there are more listeners as people drive to
and from work.
m
4.4
Table 4-7 presents radio advertisement placement fees for a radio station in
Tokyo. Time classification is based not only on 30 and 60 second rates, but is
also extended to periods of up to 5-30 minutes. A given company could
therefore buy several radio spots amounting to a total of 5-30 minutes to
advertise its products over days/weeks and at a certain time period (morning,
evening, etc.).
Advertising Costs and How They Relate to Radio Formats
The radio advertising market, in the United States and elsewhere, has become
target market specific. This has become the basis for niche formatting to
target audiences.
A product advertiser may develop a data base to determine the profile of the
buyers that would be interested in his product. Radio stations, in turn, develop
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Table 4-5
Time Classifications
WHUR, Washington, D.C.
5:30 am - 10.-00 am (Monday-Saturday) AA 10:00 am - 3:00 pm (Monday-Friday)
3:00 pm- 8:00 pm (Monday-Friday) 10:00 am - 8:00 pm (Saturday - Sunday)
7:00 am - 1I.'00 am (Sunday)
A 8.-00 pm - 12.-00 midnight (Monday-Sunday)
B 12:00 mldnight- 5:30 $35.00
AAA
SEC"--_ ._0 ".30
Grid # I $3OO $270
Grld #2 $225 $200 $190 $ _.71
Grld #3 $200 $180 $180
Grid #4 $190 $171 $170
Grid #5 $175 $158 $155
Grid #6 $144 $140
Grid #7
Grld #8
Grid #9
Grid #10
Weekly Plan
A_ A
:60 ".30 ".60 -.30
$250 $225 $200 $180
_145 j $:_1
$140 $126
$130 $117
$125 $113
$160
$145
$130
$120
$110
$162
$153
$140
$126 $120 $108
$131 $125 $113 $110 $99
$117 $115 $104 $103 $82
$108 $105 $95 $95 $86
$99 $95 $86 $85 $75
General Information
1. Grid levels based on available inventory. Grid subject to pre-emption.
2. All schedules subject to make good privileges in comparable time
periods.
3. All spots will rotate within appropriate time periods or fixed positions |
rate will apDty. i4. Fixed position - add 10% to Gricl 1. Source:WHUR, 1990
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AM DRIVE
5AM- 10AM
MONDAY-FRIDAY
$800
SATURDAY
$400
DAYTIME
10AM-3PM
SUNDAY
$300
PM DRIVE
3PM-8PM
$220 $200 $200
EVENING
8PM-IAM
$300 $150 $150
$100 $100 $100
SPONSORING SPECIAL REPORTS: 20% PREMIUM
NARROWED DAYPARTS: 30% PREMIUM
SOURCE' KYW Newsradio, Philadelphia/September 1990
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WTable 4-7
A Tokyo Radio Station
v
5:00 6:00 1:00
B A B C
5:00
J
Time Classification
Time Rate (Unit: Yen)
A Time ' BT_e C Time
g
30 minutes
25 minutes
20 minutes
15 minutes
10 minutes
5 minutes
540,000
450,000
380,000
330,000
280,00O
240,000
Spot Rate (Unit: Yen)
20 seconds 90,000
400,000
330,000
280,000
240,000
210,000
180,000
65,000
260,000
220,000
190,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
45,000
w
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m
Vtheir own data base through focus-group researchers and other means on the
types of music that appeal to various groups with particular demographic
characteristics. Based on their research, radio formats are developed and
targeted to reach the intended audience. Audience measuring organizations
then measure the degree to which a given format has attracted or maintained
the target audience. By utilizing this product and media data, the radio
advertising market has increasingly become format dependent.
While the actual prices that different formats command is a variable that
differs from station to station, and from day to day, it can generally be said
that different formats command different prices. For example, the classical
music format targets a qualified audience and in turn justifies higher rates.
Similarly, radio formats that appeal to certain women between the ages of 35
and 45, or formats targeting college audiences also command specialized rates
that are commensurate with the perceived buying power of the targeted
audience. These format-dependent specialized rates are justified in
anticipation of a given audience and the actual ratcs are computed on a per-
listener basis extrapolated from the smtit,,_ rating,_ p_rform_d by audience
measurement organizations.
Table 4-8 provides the percentage of AM (total commercial: 4,975) and FM
(total commercial: 4,269) stations that provide the various radio formats in the
U.S. Again, the pricing of the radio time (or spot) is predicated on the type of
audience reached and the numbers reached.
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Table 4-8
u
FORMAT AM
TOTAL
AM/FM mI
Adult Contemporary 15.6 % 28.5 %
Country 23.6 22.7
Religion/Gospel 11.9 3.8
CHR/Top 40 2.7 15.8
Oldies 8.4 4.5
Middle of the Road 7.7 2.2
Talk 6.8 0.2
AOR 1.0 6.2
Easy Listening 1.5 5.4
News 5.4 0.2
Spanish 3.2 1.0
Big Band/Nostalgia 3.4 0.7
Urban Contemporary 1.4 2.2
Diversified 2.3 0.8
Classic Rock 0.6 2.5
Black 1.9 0.7
Agricultural 1.6 0.8
Jazz 0.5 0.9
Classical 0.4 0.8
24.O%
22.4
8.1
8.0
6.5
5.2
3.9
3.2
3.]
3.1
2.2
2.2
1.7
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.2
0.6
0.6
m
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SOURCE: Radio Broadcasting Bureau, 1990
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SECTION 5
LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS
Y
This section presents a summary discussion of the international and domestic legal
and regulatory issues concerning the establishment of a global system for DBS-R
service. The primary issues in this regard are: (1) frequency allocation and
associated procedures for establishing and protecting DBS-R; and (2) the
comparative viability of the various structural alternatives for establishing such a
system.
5.1 DBS-R Frequency Allocation and Associated Radio Regulations
w
m
To date, no frequencies have been allocated for DBS-R Service, nor have
procedures been specified for the establishment and protection of this service.
The Agenda for WARC - 92 includes consideration of allocating frequency
bands ¢o_ DBS-R, ar_ for complementary terrestrial sound broadcasting usage
within such allocation. The Agenda also references resolutions from previous
WARCs which call for the development of procedures for protection of DBS-R
and reaccommodation in other bands of terrestrial services which may be
affected.
Currently, the ITU Radio Regulations make no definitional or procedural
distinctions between DBS-R and DBS for television. Further, no distinction is
made between DBS for fixed service applications (e.g. direct broadcast to
homes) and DBS for mobile service applications (e.g. direct broadcast to
automobiles). The frequency allocations and technical appendices that have
been adopted for DBS video to date all apply exclusively to BSS television.
The procedures for DBS-R, once they are developed, can be integrated with the
Radio Regulations: (1) as a new Article; (2) as part of existing Articles, or (3)
as a resolution dealing specifically with DBS-R. The primary concern of
adding DBS-R to the Article dealing with DBS television is that the associated
appendices might be used as precedents to plan bands for DBS-R.
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5.2 Structural Alternatives for DBS-R Systems
w
Structural alternatives considered in this study are:
• A private satellite system
• An intergovernmental satellite organization sponsored system
• A private system managed by an intergovernmental organization
• Global interconnection of different satellite systems.
m
u
5.2.1 Private DBS-R System m
m
A private DBS-R system is one in which a private corporation or other legal
entity owns the system, obtains financing, and all necessary government
approvals, and offers the DBS-R services to the public. The basic distinction
from the intergovernmental:sponsored system is that it is not established
pursuant to international treaty. The U,S. is one of the few nations in the
world that currently a!!_w_ private (non-government sponsored) satellite
systems. Other countries that permi_ such system._ Rre the United Kingdom,
Hong Kong, Japan and Luxembourg.
m
u
To successfully implement a private global DBS-R system, it is imperative that
strategic partners and favorable forums be selected to minimize regulatory
impediments. For a private system, the following regulatory issues must be
considered.
5.2.1.1 System Authorization
m
5.2.1.1.1 Authorization in the U.S.
w
Pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC §101 et seq, the FCC
has regulatory jurisdiction over all commercial use of the electromagnetic
spectrum. This would clearly include the provision of DBS-R by private
entities in the U.S. In developing a regulatory scheme for DBS-R, the FCC
must: (1) allocate sufficient frequency spectrum to DBS-R; "°'_j determine
who should receive licenses for DBS-R; and (3) determine how such
licensees should be regulated.
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The amount of spectrum allocated will drive the other determinations to be
m'_de by the FCC concerning the regulatory scheme. DBS-R, like the
Mobile Satellite Service (MSS), requires omni-directional reception,
precluding frequency re-use by satellites at different orbital locations. If
the FCC allocates only enough spectrum for one DBS-R system, as it did
with MSS, the following regulatory determinations are likely. First, if
there are multiple applicants for authorization to establish and operate
DBS-R systems, they will probably be directed to form a single consortium
as opposed to requiring the applicants to compete for the single system
license via comparative hearings, lottery, or some other mechanism. This
was the FCC's approach in MSS. Second, if there is only to be one DBS-R
system, the DBS-R operator likely will be regulated as a common carrier.
The rationale is that with limited access to this type of service, the public
interest is best served by making the system's capacity available to all
qualified users on a nondiscriminatory basis in accordance with the FCC
approved tariffs. If the DBS-R system operator lea_c_ channels to DBS-R
service providers, then it is likely that the service providers _;-ili b_
regulated as broadcasters.
If, on the other hand, the FCC allocates sufficient spectrum for multiple
systems, each space segment operator might be permitted to choose
whether to be regulated as a common carrier or as a broadcaster. The FCC
adopted this approach with DBS television applicants in 1982, with the
form of regulation based on the type of service to be offered.
Regardless or whether the space segment operator is a common carrier or
broadcaster, the Communications Act of 1934 places significant restrictions
on the amount of permissible alien ownership and control over the system.
These restrictions could impact the ability of U.S. and foreign companies to
establish jointly owned satellite systems for provision of DBS-R
internationally.
To the extent that a U.S. entity intends to establish an international
DBS-R system, additional steps must be taken. International frequency
allocations for DBS-R must be established, and relevant Radio Regulations
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specified. The FCC must then submit the appropriate technical
information to the ITU to notify other administrations of the proposed
system and coordinate with affected administrations. Consultation with
INTELSAT and notification of INMARSAT will also be required prior to
establishing the system. Further, it is likely that the FCC will require the
U.S. DBS-R applicant, among other things, to obtain agreement from at
least one foreign country within the system's planned footprint to
participate in the service offering.
5.2.1.1.2 Foreign Government Authorization N
I
5.2.1.1.3
If a private system is to be implemented on a global basis, several different
countries likely will need to authorize the Construction of DBS-R satellites.
This is for both political and practical reasons. It would not be politically
palatable to have a DBS:_systern: authorized only byu:s., broadcasting
throughout the world. Moreover, it is highly likely that the legal support of
several nations will be necessary if a DBS-R system is to be implemented nn
a global basis. Tl__is l_.eport focuses on three countries in addition to the
United States: India, Singapore and Nigeria. These countries present very
typical regulatory structures that would need to be addressed when
implementing a global DBS-R system. In particular, each of these
countries have a very powerful state broadcaster that controls almost all
television and radio programming within the country. The opportunities
for private broadcasters are either very minimal or non-existent. Also,
these countries each have very powerful Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone
(PTT) monopolies who control the telecommunications infrastructure
within these countries. The opportunities for private satellite operators to
establish systems in any of these countries do not exist. Consequently, if a
global system is to be implemented to cover any of these countries, the
cooperation and participation of the host government would be mandatory.
Private DBS-R System Implementation Considerations
When considering how to implement a global system, the DBS-R proponent
must carefully assess as to which country would provide the most
hospitable business and regulatory environment. Certainly, some
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countries would welcome such a venture with open arms. They may allow a
privately owned system or may invest in a system through the state
broadcaster or the PTT. On the other hand, some countries would reject all
DBS-R systems b=e:cause of the competitive threat provided to the PTT and
the state broadcaster.
In addition to the basic entry regulatory environment, the DBS-R
proponent must examine each potential country's laws on advertising,
trade, copyright, program content, political advertising/equal time and
..................... local broadcasting to determine how hospitable it will be to DBS-R. This
overall analysis should result in the identification of three or four countries
........ from which to initiate a global system.
5.2.2 Intergovernmental Organizations Sponsored System
There are five existing intergovernmental satellite organizations capable of
:: ::--:::est-ablishing Or participating in a global or regional DBS'R system. These are:
INTELSAT, INMARSAT, EUTELSAT, ARABSA?, and the Soviet Satellite
system INTERSPUTNIK. Each of these organizations is based on
intergovernmental Agreements among the participating member countries.
Each Agreement sets forth its objectives, including the types of services it can
provide, and the legal, technical and operational manner in which such
-- objectives are to be accomplished. Here, we evaluate and compare the ability
0leach organization to provide DBS-R on a commercially viable basis.
5.2.2.1 INTELSAT Provision of DBS-R
5.2.2.1.1 INTELSAT Options
INTELSAT's prime objective is to provide the space segment for the
_- commercial and non-discriminatory offering of international public
telecommunications services worldwide. INTELSAT's charter also permits
-- the organization to use its space segment for specialized services such as
DBS-R, but only to the extent that the provision of public
telecommunications services is not impaired. The terms and conditions
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required to establish this assurance would make DBS-R a secondary service
in every respect, and therefore make this option unattractive.
An an alternative, INTELSAT's charter permits it to finance and own
satellites as part of the INTELSAT space segment for specialized services
such as DBS-R, as long asall members of the organization agree. The issue "*
of DBS-R status is not completely resolved under this option, but
presumably it would be taken care of in the context of the organization's
unanimous decision to make such a commitment. However, since
specialized services do not enjoy the same protection against competing =
systems as do in_t.__rnational public telecommunications services provided
by INTELSAT, the financial risk factor arid market uncertainty is likely to _ i
weigh heavily against the membership deciding to pursue this option.
INTELSAT DBS-R System Authorization by U.S. Signatory
To the extent that INTELSAT decides to provide DBS-R under either
option, Comsat, as the U.S. Signatory to INT-ELSAT, " ,-' "_, n_.,a hav_. tn obtain
permission from the FCC to participate. Its role would be that of a common
carrier, pursuant to the 1962 Satellite Act and the 1934 Communications
Act. As such, it would be subject to traditional rate and service regulation.
Since DBS-R would be a service separate and distinct from Comsat's other qr
Signatory service offerings, Comsat would have to isolate the capital and _
expense associated with INTELSAT's provision of DBS-R, establish w
separate accounts for computing rates to users, and to file a complete _
description of its accounting system and cost allocation procedures with its ,
tariffs.
Comsat's participation as U.S. Signatory in INTELSAT DBS-R services
will probably be challenged by U.S. competitors as beyond the scope of =
Comsat's Signatory responsibilities. However, the INTELSAT Agreement, w
which entered into force subsequent to the 1962 Satellite Act which
established Comsat, specifically provides for such a service offering. "*
F,rLher, the FCC has already determined that Comsat's Signatory role
within INMARSAT includes the provision of aeronautical services, and the 1,.
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legal basis for that decision is much more subject to challenge than a
decision permitting provision of DBS-R service would be.
5.2.2.1.3 INTELSAT DBS-R Authorization By Foreign Signatories
The INTELSAT organization consists of almost 120 member nations from
all over the world. All but a few of these countries participate in
INTELSAT through the government owned and operated P2_. Since most
countries' domestic telecommunications are also government operations,
including broadcasting, implementation of DBS-R via INTELSAT would
most likely be handled by the existing government operators.
The Soviet Union and a few other Eastern European countries are not
members of INTELSAT, but efforts by parties concerned are underway to
change this. Nevertheless, non-member countries could provide and
receive DBS-R services via INTELSAT DBS-R through their authorized
telecommunications entities.
=
5.2.2.2 INMARSAT Provision of DBS-R
5.2.2.2.1 INMARSAT Options
INMARSAT was established to provide space segment for maritime
communications services. Since its inception, its charter has been
expanded to include aeronautical communications, and new amendments
are pending to permit land mobile services. Maritime and safety and
distress services have priority over aeronautical and land mobile services.
The land mobile amendments appear broad enough to permit the
organization to provide DBS-R service over land. INMARSAT has already
instituted maritime services with broadcast characteristics, including fleet
call services, and slow scan broadcast television, which is accessible to
vessels by subscription.
v
This option is unattractive for one major reason, i.e., the secondary status of
DBS-R within the land mobile services category. Technically, INMARSAT
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wmay be very qualified to operate the DBS-R service. However,
organizationally, the DBS-R will represent a major departure from
INMARSAT's original and primary objective, i.e., maritime services.
5.2.2.2.2 INMARSAT DBS-R System Authorization by U.S. Signatory
As with INTELSAT, if INMARSAT intends to offer DBS-R, Comsat has to
formally request permission from the FCC to participate in the "service
offering". Comsat's role would be that of a common carrier, subject to the
same regulatory requirements as described in the paragraph concerning its
responsibilities as U.S. Signatory to INTELSAT.
As previously noted, the limits of Comsat's Signatory role in INMARSAT
have been challenged on the basis that the INMARSAT Act does not
specifically confer to Comsat U.S. Signatory status beyond maritime
service activities. Nevertheless, the FCC has determined that the Act does
not prohibit Cornsat's provision of other INMARSAT services in the context
of its Signatory roie a_ long" as such services are ancillary to and supportive
of Comsat's provision of maritime service. This determination was made in
the context of Comsat's application to participate in INMARSAT's
aeronautical service offering. A strong argument could be made that it
would extend to DBS-R as well should INMARSAT decide to offer the
service.
5.2.2.2.3 INMARSAT DBS-R Authorization by FqreiEn Signatories
INMARSAT consists of approximately 55 member nations. The Soviet
Union and other Eastern European countries are also members of
INMARSAT. As with INTELSAT, the INMARSAT Agreement permits
lease of space segment by authorized telecommunications entities of non-
member countries, but not investment or participation in decision making.
w
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5.2.2.3 EUTELSAT Provision of DBS-R
5.2.2.3.1 EUTELSAT Options
EUTELSAT was established to provide space segment required for public
telecommunications services throughout Europe. As with INTELSAT, the
EUTELSAT space segment may also be made available for the provision of
specialized services such as DBS-R within Europe, provided that the
provision of public telecommunications services is not unfavorably affected
and the arrangements are otherwise acceptable from a technical and
economic standpoint.
EUTELSAT may also provide separate satellites for specialized
telecommunications services, and the provision of such services is not
specifically limited to European territory. As with INTELSAT,
EUTELSAT can finance such a satellite if there is unanimous consent of
the membership. Additionally,_the issue of secondary status for DBS-R
appears to be less relevant on a separate EUTELSAT sai,e_i'*e cs_ablished
specifically for DBS-R than if DBS-R is to be provide on EUTELSAT's
primary space segment. One distinction between EUTELSAT and
INTELSAT with regard to this option is that unanimity would be far easier
to achieve since the membership is so much smaller.
5.2.2.3.2 U.S. Domestic Issues
The United States is not a member of EUTELSAT. However, the
EUTELSAT Agreement specifically permits the telecommunications
administrations or entities to negotiate and enter directly into agreements
with EUTELSAT. Although it does not specify whether such
administrations or entities must be under the jurisdiction of member
countries, it appears that telecommunications entities of non-members
could negotiate such agreements with EUTELSAT.
U.S. private entities wishing to access EUTELSAT to transmit or recei_
DBS-R programming must obtain FCC authorization to do so. Although
there have been no direct precedents for such access as yet, the U.S.
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transborder and separate international systems policies serve as useful
analogies. These analogies must be carefully considered in the context of
U.S. broadcast regulations under Title IH of the 1934 Act. =
I
5.2.2.4
5.2.2.4.1
5.2.2.4.2
ARABSAT Provision of DBS-R
ARABSAT Options
ARABSAT's charter is to provide a communications satellite system for the
provision of general and specialized services to Arab states. The definitions
of these types of services are analogous to public and specialized services,
respectively, as defined in the INTELSAT Agreement. The distinguishing
factor, however, is that the ARABSAT charter does not differentiate
between these services in terms of status or priority. In fact, DBS-R is
specifically recognized as an important service to be provided by the
organization in meeting its objectives.
,,,caougt'. ARABSAT's primary purpose is to serve the telecommunications
needs of the Arab states, its charter permits it to engage in any other
activities that serve the objectives of the corporation. Presumably,
therefore, the ARABSAT membership could permit access to the system by
non-member countries and their telecommunications entities if they
determined it in their interest to do so.
U.S. Domestic Issues
As with EUTELSAT or any other foreign satellite system, U.S. private
entities wishing to access ARABSAT to transmit or receive DBS-R
programming must obtain FCC authorization to do so. The same issues
discussed for EUTELSAT are applicable here.
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5.2.2.5 Private System Managed Bv International Organizations
An attractive optiu, is the management of a private DBS-R system by an
intergovernmental satellite organization. The intergovernmental
organization would provide the political framework necessary to obtain
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landing rights in countries throughout the world, while the private system
could generate financial support without political impediments associated
with intergovernmental organizations.
The charters of both INTELSAT and EUTELSAT can generally be
interpreted to permit those organizations to serve in a management
capacity for a private system, as long as there is no adverse economic or
technical impact to that organization. The private system would pay an
appropriate management fee as compensation for such services.
Global Interconnection of Different DBS-R Systems
Another option is that multiple regional systems, either private,
governmental, or a combination of both, could establish joint operating
agreements to provide global DBS-R services. These systems, which
independently would cover different geographic areas, would not have to be
established at the same time.
Unless the FCC determines otherwise (for reasons arising from the joint
operating agreement or some other factor), the U.S. regulatory regime
would depend on the degree of reciprocity that the system operators would
be willing to entertain. New ground may have to be broken as far as
regulation of foreign broadcasts into U.S. is concerned. However, the FCC
is likely to encourage rather than inhibit progress in establishing systems
to facilitate cultural exchanges.
Observations on DBS-R Legal and Regulatory Issues
The legal and regulatory issues identified here are based on the assumption
that NASA and VOA do not intend to be DBS-R owners or operators. Rather,
NASA's interest is in assisting the development of technology for DBS-R to a
point that it can be transferred to the private sector for use in commercial
systems. VOA's interest is in identifying options that facilitate its ability to
access, as a customer and service provider, sysi.zms capable of providing space
segment for international DBS-R services on a commercial basis.
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We have explored the legal and regulatory aspects of the range of options
available to meet the above stated requirements of NASA and VOA within two
basic categories: (1) private non-treaty organizations; and (2) treaty
organizations. Following is a summary of the observations.
Private Non-Treaty Organizations
BA private non-treaty based organization would be in the best position to
expeditiously develop and implement a financial and business plan for DBS-R.
This can be done with a minimum of internal administrative barriers. _--
However, the private non-treaty organization will likely need to resolve a
multiplicity of regulatory issues in a variety of countries, in order to minimize
these impediments, it will be necessary for the private organization to strike
strategic alliances with state broadcasters and telecommunication entities
who have significant political clout to break down the regulatory and legal
barriers to DBS-R. It will also be necessary to analyze and select political --
forums that are hospitable to D_ S-.,. have l,,e,a,,_d the United States as
one forum that would be hospitabie :ol DBS-P.. Further research analyzing
legal and regulatory issues in a number of countries will need to be conducted u
before other forums can be accurately identified.
B
In order to implement a private non-treaty system, a partnership or
corporation should be established whose purpose is to develop and implement a
DBS-R system. Equity in this entity should be spread among parties that can
contribute technology or political clout to the DBS-R system. VOA's role in the
system should be limited to leasing transponders from the satellite operator.
In this regard, a transponder lease is likely to be used to provide collateral for
the project's underlying financing. This presents a special problem for both
VOA and the DBS-R operators because VOA as a government agency has
limited ability to make long-term contractual commitments. Since it is likely
that a number of the initial DBS-R transponders will be leased by existing
international government broadcasters, means must be found for governments
to guarantee the leases. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult for th_ DBS-R
operator to obtain the financing necessary to construct, launch and op=, a_e the
satellite system.
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5.3.2.1
Treaty Organizations
Within the category of treaty organizations, we have concluded that a new
treaty organization for DBS-R service is not a realistic option, because of the
politics and amount of time required to establish such an organization. With
regard to existing treaty organizations, both INTELSAT and INMARSAT
have current legal constraints on their ability to provide DBS-R service.
However, the extent to which these legal constraints are an impediment to
either of these organizations' provisions of DBS-R, on a commercially viable
basis, is largely a function of that organization's membership's desire to enter
the DBS-R market.
INTELSAT
INTELSAT's charter permits the organization to use its space segment for
specialized services such as DBS-R, but only to the extent that the provision
of public telecommunications services is not impa_ed. Thc tc,n,,,_ and
rondLtions required to establish this assurance would make DBS-K =,
secondary service in every respect, and therefore make this option
unattractive.
As an alternative, INTELSAT's charter permits it to finance and own
satellites as part of the INTELSAT space segment for specialized services
such as DBS-R, as long as all members of the organization agree. In this
context, the term "satellites" could mean completely separate spacecraft, or
it could mean transponders that "piggyback" on INTELSAT spacecraft
planned for public telecommunications services. Even in this case,however,
neither the separate spacecrafts or piggyback options for DBS-R could be
permitted to adversely affect INTELSAT's provision of public
telecommunications services in any way. Conditions of use would be
established by the Assembly of Parties and included in the terms of
contract between INTELSAT and any users of the DBS-R space segment.
Discussions v;ith Comsat indicate that the current INTELSAT system has
existing IBS offerings that might be suitable for DBS-R to fixed points for
further distribution via terrestrial means. It is possible that the use of
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spread spectrum techniques at Ku-band might be capable of providing high
quality small antenna introductory services. These discussions further
indicate that a DBS-R transponder could be incorporated into the
INTELSAT VIII series of satellites, but that the technical characteristics of
the INTELSAT VIII series, as currently defined, are unsuitable for
implementing such a modification.
INMARSAT
5.4
INMARSAT's charter permits the provision of DBS-R services in the
maritime environment, but does not permit such services to be provided
over land. The pending land mobile amendments to INMARSAT's charter
do not appear broad enough to remove this limitation. Despite its current
limitations, the prospect of a near-term amendment to permit INMARSAT
to provide DBS-R over land should be considered a viable option. The
organization's membership has twice demonstrated (with aeronautical and
land mobile services) its ability to quickly amend its charter when
convinced _hat such amendment is in the best interest of the organization.
Despite the current limitations of its charter, INMARSAT's current space
segment is used to provide DBS-R services for AFRTS and a group of
islands in the Pacific Ocean Region. The current system could be used for
additional experimentation and testing of DBS-R services. With regard to
the next generation INMARSAT space segment, Comsat has stated that it
might be possible to include an experimental transponder for DBS-R
services on these spacecraft, which are currently entering the design phase.
Conclusions from Legal and Re_rulatory Perspective
The DBS-R service is unique in that it must grapple with bilateral and
multilateral issues pertaining to cross border broadcasts, copyright laws,
and equitable access to DBS-R channels. The service could be offered under
the auspices of established international satellite operators such as
INMARSAT or INTELSAT to seek expedited resolution of these issues.
However, under this option, DBS-R service will neither have the priority
nor the focused organizational support that such an innovative service will
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require to be successful. It is believed that privately financed and operated
systems, subscribing to common technical guidelines established by an
international organization, offer the best prospect for bringing DBS-R
service to the marketplace. The term 'private' here also refers to
organizations such as the European Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (EUTELSAT) and Arab Satellite Consortium (ARABSAT)
who might be best situated to operate regional systems.
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
might mandate a consortium type of structure, in the event there are
several applicants vying for a license to operate the service. The FCC may
also require the operator to be a common carrier with access to the DBS-R
channel regulated on a common carrier basis. The broadcasters who buy or
lease channels will be responsible for the content of the programming
material and will be regulated as broadcasters.
r=
c
Several legal issues remain unresolved. For example, wi!! an international
broadcaster, leasing capacity oa a US DBS-R systcm, be subject to FCC
regulations? Could bilateral or multilateral arrangements be made to
address this issue on the basis of reciprocity? Does the US Government
have an obligation to ensure that third world countries are not deprived of
access to US DBS-R channels because of predatory pricing? Forums such as
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the United
Nations Organization (UNO) might be ideal to debate and resolve these
issues.
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SECTION 6
BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS
u
r
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Market research on the domestic and global radio audiences, and a marked trend in
consumers' preference for higher quality audio products unequivocally suggest that
the DBS-R system presents an opportunity to an entrepreneur. The enabling
technology is at hand. However, the technological feasibility is only one of several
determinants in assessing the viability of a DBS-R system from the marketplace
perspective. An entrepreneur must make a persuasive case to convince investors
that their rate of return on such a system will be commensurate with the risk they
are taking.
In this section, we present a summary of the market, technical, and cost factors that
are pertinent to developing a business case for the DBS-R system.
a.l DBS-R MARKET NICHE
Figure 6-1 is a Product-Service Market Needs Matrix highlighting the
unsatisfied market needs that DBS-R can uniquely address. Note that the
direction of market evolution is clearly from:
a few channels of poor quality and problematic reliability which are
difficult to tune, typified by shortwave broadcasts typical in some
developing countries; to
a dozen or so channels of shortwave quality available nationally,
complemented by a few local AM channels, neither of which are
conveniently tunable, typical in more economically advantaged developing
countries; to
a mix of FM and AM quality signals, with up to forty channels available in
developed vrban areas, but lacking compact disk quality or reliable inter-
urban coverage; to
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• two to three dozen compact disk quality channels, easily tuned with
uniform quality across nationwide areas.
The DBS-R market objective is to penetrate and eventually dominate the 2 +
billion existing terrestrial radio sets with new digital satellite radios.
DBS-R RECEIVER MARKET PENETRATION
The benefits of DBS-R are, of course, entirely dependent on the number of
DBS-R receivers in the market. Without a large base of receivers, it will not be
cost effective to provide any programming. A conservative approach is to use
actual growth rates for radio Sets in the Third World as the basis for
estimating satellite radio receiver market penetration. The assumptions and
considerations for using this historical radio sales data are as follows:
It is assumed that market behavior for purchasing shortwave, AM and FM
radios will reflect market behavior for purchasing comparably priced
DBS-R receivers.
It is assumed that satellite radio receivers will incorporate one or more
other radio bands to maximize their market potential, especially during the
initial transitional period.
m_ It is assumed that the lack of familiarity with DBS-R service and satellite
radio receiver is comparable to the newness of terrestrial radio receivers
during the market comparison period (1955-1990).
The effect of modern technology and modern market distribution
mechanisms for consumer electronics, which enables faster diffusion of new
products, is considered an enabling factor in the DBS-R receiver
penetration of the market.
With these caveats in mind, Tables 6-1 and 6-2 provide the estimated market
build-up of satellite radio receivers for developing and developed countries
assuming DBS-R facilities are emplaced during 1993-95. Tables 6-1 and 6-2
were developed by extrapolating the data presented earlier in Figures 2-6 and
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TABLE 6-1
PROJECTED DEW'ELOPING WORLD SATELLITE
RADIO SETS IN USE BASED ON
HISTORICAL DATA FOR GROWTH OF TERRESTRIAL RADIO SETS
u
Terr. Radio: 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Sat. Radio: 1995 2000 200.___55 2010 201.._._5 2020 202____55 2030
Sets in Use: 10M 50M 100M 150M 200M 300M 400M 600M U
TABLE 6-2
PROJECTED DEVELOPED COUNTRY SATELLITE
RADIO SETS IN USE BASED ON
HISTORICAL DATA FOR GROWTH OF TERRESTRIAL RADIO
SETS
Terr. Radio: 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960
Sat. Radio: 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Sets in Use: 1M 50M 100M- 150M 200M 300M
!
U
m
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mm
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Terr. Radio: 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Sat. Radio: 202_._.55 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Sets in Use: 400M 600M 700M 800M 900M 1 Bil
2-8. For both sets of countries, the historical growth rate has been a
remarkably consistent 10 to 20 million radio sets per year. Even the worst-
case data, that for erstwhile Communist countries where government controls
interfered with radio set acquisition, demonstrate a historical growth rate of 5
million radio sets per year.
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The difference in absolute numbers of radios owned between developed and
developing countries reflects the 20 year "head-start" developed countries had
in putting radio transmission facilities in place. This "head-start" is unlikely
to be a factor for DBS-R because of the much greater ease of initiating services
as c_r.trasted with terrestrial services requiring emplacement of extensive
facilities.
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zAlso, differences in the economic conditions between developed and developing
countries are automatically built into the count of total radios in use.
Although developed country per capital gross national product (GNP) is much
higher than that in developing countries, the developing countries enjoy a 5:1
advantage in total population. Were economic conditions similar, one would
expect developing countries to have many more radio sets in use. Instead, as
Table 6-1 shows, developed countries generally have 2 to 3 times as many radio
sets as developing countries.
6.3 Technical Considerations
Technical considerations for a DBS-R system include providing for its
constituent space, control and user segments. All necessary technologies for
these three segments currently exist and have been demonstrated in non-
DBS-R applications. The key technical consideration is to accomplish an
optimal and smoothly integrated combination of the necessary space, control
and user scgment technologies.
6.3.1 DBS-R System Technological Feasibility
Although no DBS-R system exists today, the necessary technical, market,
operational, financial and management elements have each been
demonstrated in other instances. The challenge of the DBS-R entrepreneur is
to combine these proven elements in a new way to serve the vast public market
for radio programming service.
Technically, the concept of" satellite-to-user direct broadcast transmissions has
been demonstrated in practice since the early 1970's in NASA experiments.
Today, both Japan and Western Europe enjoy commercial direct satellite
broadcast television systems. Although a DBS-R system will require smaller
(and even mobile) satellite antennas, unlike the fixed-mount dishes of
DBS-TV, such handheld and mobile satellite antennas are in routine use today
by the GPS Navstar, Geost_r and INMARSAT users.
Marketwise, radios represent the most ubiquitous communications medium
available. Whether the market is the United States, where the radios
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outnumber telephones by a margin of more than 2 to 1, or Africa, where at
least one in seven persons owns a radio, there is no doubt concerning the
existence of a robust radio market. Although DBS-R radios will need to co-
exist and eventually dominate existing AM, FM and shortwave radios, there is
ample evidence from the recent replacement of LP record players with compact
disks players that the public is willing to rapidly switch technologies to better
address their listening needs.
Operationally, there are several success stories worldwide of new satellite
systems, operated as businesses. Among these stories are JCSat in Japan,
Telesat in Canada, Astra in Europe, PanAmSat in the Atlantic Region, and
AsiaSat in the Far Pacific. Hencel there is a relatively well-worn path to
business success via operating a satellite system on a commercial basis. It
should be noted that the above-mentioned examples include systems which
have grown from entrepreneurial funding.
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6.3.2
One of the s,_'o_nlficant risks facing a satellite system is acquisition of the
necessary financial capdbi!ity to achieve initial operations. While this
milestone has been accomplished from entrepreneurial roots by several
companies-- Geostar, PanAmSat, Astra, British Satellite Broadcasting--
there have been other companies that have failed to achieve satellite
financing-- National Exchange, United States Satellite Broadcasting, and
Comsat's Satellite Television Corporation. The keys to success appears to lie
more with management's astuteness in financial development and business
staging, than in the inherent aspects of the satellite technology. Hence,
effective management is one of the most important ingredients for DBS-R
business success.
Space Se_rnent Technical Considerations
DBS-R space segment technical considerations pertain to system capacity or
number of channels, and the geographic coverage area. As with most any
telecommunications system, the greater the capacity, the greater the cost. It is
axiomatic to business planning that one not install greater capacity than is
necessary for near-term demand. This axiom leads to the business planning
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Fconclusion that DBS-R space segment technology should focus, in the near-
term, on small capacity satellite technology, which minimizes capital outlays.
Budgetary quotes obtained from spacecraft manufacturers have resulted in
delivery-to-orbit costs for the smallest increment of satellite sound
broadcasting capacity of $70-80 million, inclusive of satellite construction,
launch and insurance. The level of capacity provided by this entry level
system is consistent with the lower range of data rates shown in Figure 6-2,
which is compiled by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). These data rates
would support approximately 10 channels of varying quality programming
(from several AM-stereo to a couple CD) to a continental coverage area such as
North America, South America, Africa, Europe and European Russia, South
Asia or Oceania.
o .
6.3.3 Ground Segment Technical Considerations
The purpose of the DBS-R ground s%_ovnent is to feed ,._,-_1._,,.,_,,,-_.1 programming to
the satellites for distribution, and to cun_iol Lb_ i,eclmi_a, status of the
satellite. There are no unique technical challenges in this area insofar as
many thousands of hours of satellite uplinks have been accomplished
worldwide for television and indirect sound distribution. The key technical
considerations for the ground segment are:
• Geographic location of tracking, telemetry and command (TT&C) Center;
• Geographic location(s) ofuplink centers; and
• Frequency bands for ground segment functions.
Geographic location of TT&C is important because any interruption of TT&C
could result in a total loss of the DBS-R satellite. Hence, the highest priority
must be given to technical integrity and physical security of the TT&C facility.
Geographic location of program uplink facilities is important because ex_,;a
costs will have to be incurred in delivering programming to the uplink centers.
However, the availability of relatively low-cost INTELSAT and private
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6.3.4
channels for audio bandwidth transmission-enables the uplink center(s) to be
anywhere in the world as long as they can access the INTELSAT and/or
private satellite system.
Frequency band choice is important because many frequencies do not
propagate well through the atmosphere. Since degradation in the program
uplink affects the quality and reliability of a transmission to all of the DBS-R
listeners, paramount consideration must be paid to ensuring a well-propagated
uplink.
From a cost standpoint, experience with other satellite systems has repeatedly
shown that satellite ground facilities cost 5-15% of total space segment costs,
and require a commensurate level of annual expenditure for operations.
Accordingly, for the small satellite baseline being considered here, a control
center can be expected to cost on an average $3 to 4 million per satellite, plus a
comparable level of annual expenditures for salaries, general, administrative
and other operating costs. An attract':ve alternative would be to acquire
control services :_om an es_abii3hea satellite system operator who already has
the infrastructure in place.
DBS-R Receiver Segment Technical Considerations
The receiver or user segment for a DBS-R system consists of the various types
of low-cost satellite radio receiver sets. Key technical considerations and
trade-offs for such radio sets are:
• Frequency band of operation
• Datarate (sound quality)
• Size and power (for portables)
• Numberofchannels tuneable
• Fixed or variable data rates
• Modulation/transmission standards
Because of the inter-dependence of space and user segments, it is essential that
system requirements and their allocation to space and user segments be
carefully considered. It is imperative that propagation measurements be made
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at the spectral band allocated to DBS-R to ensure that link margins are w
optimal.
J
Preliminary research indicates that the basic materials costs of DBS-R
receiver are less than $150 in 25,000 lot quantities, less than $100 in 100,000
lot quantities, and less than $35 in 1 million lot quantities. The most
expensive part (s) will be customized Application Specific Integrated Circuits :
(ASICs) to do the digital information and signal processing. Labor for devices
similar to a DBS-R receiver is less than $3-10 per unit, and overhead
amortization ranges from $5-30 per unit, depending on local factory conditions, u
These numbers are consistent with retail prices for a DBS-R receiver of $150 to
$350, depending on lot quantity, local factory production conditions, and
competition among suppliers. Yet lower prices would result from production
levels consistent with current radio set production (greater than 20 million per
year).
DBS-R System Operations Costs
The space systems, being capital-intensive, require careful upfront assessment
to ascertain their viability from a business perspective. The DBS-R has the
added challenge of creating and stimulating the commercial production of a
new product, i.e., the DBS-R receiver.
W
The cost of revenue projections for DBS-R must follow the customary business
practice where costs are broken down into capital and operations and i-
maintenance (O&M) categories. Business considerations dictate that the i,
revenues must exceed cost of revenue by a healthy margin to assure investors a
rate of return commensurate with the risk that a business venture such as w
DBS-R entails.
w
The DBS-R system capital costs are the upfront costs incurred to purchase
spacecraft, launch vehicle(s), launch services, launch insurance, and the
capitalized interest charges accrued until the assets can be plated into w
revenue-generating service. The size of the spacecraft depends upon the
capacity, i.e., the number of channels, and the number of spacecraft depends
upon the desired geographical coverage. For example, an Entry System
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capable of offering 15 AM quality channels to cover the continental United
States would be characterized as a small satellite system referred to as
"Lightsat". Such a spacecraft would have power output requirement on the
order of 70 watts. On the other hand, a spacecraft capable of covering the
entire continental United States with four 3-degree beams and offering up to
50 channels, would be characterized as a medium sized satellite with power
output requirement on the order of 200 watts. The spacecraft size and cost can
be directly inferred from the spacecraft power.
i
The launch vehicle costs depend upon the weight of the spacecraft and any
appendages such as the apogee kick motor, that must be lifted off the ground.
Traditional launch vehicle manufacturers such as General Dynamics, Martin
Marietta, and McDonnell Douglas in the United States, and Arianespace in
Europe offer launch vehicles capable of launching medium and heavy
satellites. Charges per spacecraft launch typically exceed $40 million and
average around $50 million. Recently, the Peoples Republic of China has
successfully demonstrated its capability to place o_^t1_,^_ ;,_+_ ,_
geosynchronous orbit via its Long March rocket at prices around $50 ,r.:ilic_,
per spacecraft. Several other private companies notably Orbital Sciences
Corporation and Space Services Inc. are developing launch vehicles to launch
relatively smaller satellites at prices much less than the traditional
manufacturers'. For the DBS-R entry system, dubbed Lightsat, these vehicles
offer an extremely attractive price/performance ratio.
The launch insurance rates which averaged around 5% prior to the Challenger
disaster in early 1986 had risen to 25% by 1988 following a series of launch
vehicle failures suffered by Arianespace, Martin Marietta, and General
Dynamics. At the present time, following several successful launches, the
rates have gravitated downward to 15 to 20 percent depending upon the
history of the launch vehicle performance.
The O&M costs pertain to day-to-day operations costs. For the DBS-R system,
these costs include the cost of maintaining and operating technical facilities
such as the tel=metry, tracking, and command (TT&C) center and uplink
center(s) to uplink programming material to the satellite. The satellite
monitor and control function requires a specialized facility staffed with
6-11
engineers and technicians skilled in orbit determination and control and
several spacecraft engineering disciplines. For a small capacity DBS-R system
hosted on a Lightsat, it might be more cost-effective to lease these services
from an established satellite operator.
Table 6-3 shows the capital and O&M costs and Table 6-4 shows revenue
requirements for DBS-R systems. For the purpose of this exercise, we have
assumed spectrum allocation in the 1.5 GHz region. The costing data will be
favorably impacted if the spectrum allocation is in the 1.0 GHz region but will
be adversely impacted if it is in the 2.5 GHz region. It can be seen from Table
6-4 that for a low capacity system, the DBS-R operator must charge a
minimum of $340 per channel per hour to assure 18% rate of return on the
capital employed. For a medium capacity system, i.e., 45 channels the capital
cost is likely to be $110 million. Revenue requirement per channel per hour for
$110 million investment reduces to $151. For a high capacity, i.e., 100 channel
spacecraft, the capital employed is on the order of $140 million, and the
revenue requirement per hour per channel reduces to $89.
_I
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Table 6-3
DBS-R System Operation Costs
SPA.CECRAFT
CHAR..ACTERISTICS
Beginning of Life Weight (Kg)
RF Power Requirement (W)
Solar Power Requirement (W)
CA PITA L COSTS
Spacecraft and Launch Vehicle ($M)
Capitalized Interest ($M)
Launch Insurance ($M)
Technical Facilities ($M)
Startup Cost ($M)
Total Capital Cost ($M)
OPERATIONS AND
MAINTENANCE
l'O- - -COSTSr EAR2
Technical Operations ($M)
(Satellite Control & Uplink Centers)
On-Orbit Insurance ($M)
General & Administrative (G&A) ($M)
TOTAL O&M COST/YR ($M)
O&M Cost per Channel per hour ($)
(66% duty cycle)
ii i
SYSTEM CAPACITY
(NUMBER OF PROGRAMS OR CHANNELS)*
15 CHANNELS
(LOW)
410
68
478
56
6
14
3
3
82
2.0
1.6
3.0
6.6
76
45 CHANNELS
(MEDIUM)
510
203
1,085
70
16
14
5
5
110
3.0
2.2
4.0
9.2
35
105 CHANNELS
(HIGH)
711
476
2,300
90
20
18
7
7
142
5.0
2.8
6.0
13.8
23
SAM quality channels (32Kbps). Note that O&M cost per channel per i,our for a
higher quality channel scales directly in terms of the data rate ratios. For example,
FM-mono channel (48 Kbps) cost is 1.5 timesthat of an AM channel (32 Kbps) cost.
6-13
Table 6-4
DBS-R System Revenue Requirement for a Private System
DEPRECIATION COSTS/YEAR
Space Segment
(10 yrs life) ($M)
Technical Facilities
(20 yrs life) ($M)
OTHER COSTS/YEAR
Cost of Money
(15% per yr; average) ($M)
Return on Capital Employed
(18:,A, average) ($M)
REVENUE REC_UIREMENT PER
CHANNEL PER HOUR-'_
(66% duty cycle)
Depreciation Cost per Channel per
hour ($)
Other Costs per Channel per hour ($)
O&M Cost per Channel per hour ($)
(From Table 1-2)
SYSTEM CAPACITY
(NUMBER OF PROGRAMS OR CHANNELS)*
15 CHANNELS
LOW
7.9
0.15
6.6
8.2
93
171
76
45 CHANNELS
MEDIUM
10.5
0.25
8.8
! I.[J
41
75
35
105 CHANNELS
HIGH
13.5
0.35
11.4
14.2
23
43
23
TOTAL 340 151 89
*AM quality channels (32 Kbps). The revenue requirement for a higher quality
channel scales directly in the ratio of data rates. See footnote to Table 1-2.
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6.5 DBS-R and Shortwave Broadcasting Cost Comparison
The only comparable radio broadcasting facility with which to compare DBS-R
operating costs is shortwave, because both uniquely cover large, continental-
size regions. Comparisons with local AM and FM broadcasting are not
meaningful since these facilities cover a relatively small fraction of the
geographic area served by a satellite facility.
Using operating cost per transmitter hour as the metric, the data provided
above imply the following operating costs per transmitter hour per continent
for DBS-R facilities:
w
Lightsat $76 per channel per hour
Medium Capacity $35 per channel per hour
T _,_,.,.,-, _.-_+,_11_-o $23 per channel per hour
w
By comparison, data on shortwave operating costs range across the following
values:
50 KW Religious $44.87 per transmitter hour
500 KW Religious $145.09 per transmitter hour
Radio Canada Int'l $120.94 per transmitter hour
VOA
Radio Nederland
BBC
BBC-Regional
Senegal
$187.50 per transmitter hour
$195.50 per transmitter hour
$189.52 per transmitter hour
$199.58 per _,ransmitter hour
$50.63 per transmitter hour
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Note that transmission hour figures are based on actual hours of transmitting,
nearly always less than full-time and greater than half-time, and are averaged
over the various facilities that each broadcaster operates. Based on typical
shortwave facility construction costs, including transmitter, antennae and
buildings, the shortwave costs per transmitter hour should be increased by 10 to
20% for depreciation and amortization. Furthermore, implicit government
subsidies result in an underestimating of shortwave operating costs by an
indeterminate amount.
The DBS-R System operations and maintenance costs vary from $76 per
channel per hour for the low capacity system to $23 per channel per hour for the
high capacity system. Because of the higher quality and reliability of the DBS-
R transmissions, it is not necessary to broadcast the same material on three
different frequencies, as is the casewith shortwave transmissions. Therefore,
the DBS-R System O&M costs on per program hour basis are an order of
magnitude less ($600 for shortwavc "_'ersus$23 for DBS-R) than that for
shortwave systems.
Tables 3-1 and 6-3compare the day-to-day costs and ignore the depreciation and
finance coststhat a private system must contend with. The shortwave facilities'
useful life is on the order of 30 years compared with the DBS-R spacecraft life
which is typically on the order of 10 years. The international broadcasters
maintain comprehensive capital improvement programs to upgrade their
facilities. For example, VOA's shortwave facilities capital improvement
program for the past 10 years has entailed expenditures of roughly $50 to $100
million per year and is anticipated to continue at the same level for the
foreseeable future. Capital expenditures on this order add substantially to the
real costs of delivering programming above and beyond that reflected in the
day-to-day operations costs shown in Table 3-1.
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Revenue requirement projections for a privately financed and operated system,
where the capital expenditure is not written off and a reasonable rate of return
is expected on capital employed, are shown in Table 6-4. Note that the revenue
requirement on a per channel per hour basis assuming 66% utilization varies
from a high of $340 for the low capacity system to a low of $89 for the high
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capacity system. The economies offered by the DBS-R System are dramatic
even after all costs, i.e., O&M, depreciation, finance charges, and profit are
accounted for. The low capacity system is attractive because it provides a quick
entry into a new market with low capital requirement and in a time frame on
the order of 18 months. The high capacity system, though _t requires more
capital and a gestation period on the order of 36 months, is very attractive
because of increased flexibility and very favorable revenue requirements. The
business decision as to whether to proceed with the low or high capacity system
depends upon an entrepreneurial assessment of the risk, market potential, and
the business environment.
It should be noted that, as previously stated, the shortwave facilities operations
costs do not include allowances for depreciation, cost of money, or profit. Since
most of the shortwave facilities are owned and operated by either Government
or not-for-profit private entities, this practice is not questioned. For a privately-
financed and owned system, operated on commercial basis, these expenditures
account for a majority of the annual operating expenses (70% in Table 6-4).
Therefore, the real costs for distributing programming o vet skort ;, a_e _ilities
are much higher than shown in Table 3-1.
It is apparent that costs to international broadcasters such as VOA will be much
less over the DBS-R than over the shortwave facilities. It is also noteworthy
that as DBS-R matures, the costs are expected to decline.
Maximum-Minimum Boundary Analysis
We can bound the expected cost range for satellite and shortwave operating
costs by comparing the maximum and minimum cost data from each set. The
maximum cost data from the satellite set is given by lightsat satellite system
as $340 per channel hour. The maximum cost data from the shortwave set is
given by BBC's Regional Service -- $198.58 per transmitter hour -- which
should be multiplied by 1.2 to account for depreciation and amortization,
y_.e!ding $238.30. It is clear that the upper bound cost figures for satellite and
sho. i.wave are comparable to each other.
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The minimum cost data from the satellite set is given by the large satellite at
$89.00 per channel hour. The minimum cost data from the shortwave data set
is given by the 50 KW religious broadcasters as $44.87 per transmitter hour.
This number will be multiplied by 1.2 to account for depreciation and
amortization, yielding $53.84 per transmitter hour. This number is
comparable to the satellite minimum cost data.
While comparing programming distribution costs of international
broadcasters via shortwave and DBS-R facilities, it must be recognized that
international broadcasters such asVOA typically broadcast the same material
on 3 different frequencies using 3 separate transmitters to safeguard against
natural and man-made interference sources. Therefore, the cost to VOA of
distributing one hour of programming material via the shortwave facilities is 3
times that of a transmitter hour, i.e., approximately $450 to $500 per hour.
The DBS-R becauseof immunity from natural noise sources, will not require
broadcast over multiple channels. Hence, DBS-R offers the prospect of
reducing broadcasting costsby a considerable margin.
Organization Considerations
The establishment and operation of a DBS-R system faces many legal and
regulatory challenges. For a national system, the DBS-R operator must
receive permission to use a part of the frequency spectrum and must comply
with any licensing requirements that might be imposed. For a regional or
global system, spectrum allocation must be approved by an international
organization such as WARC. The issues of cross-border broadcasting and
copyright law enforcement must also be dealt with. It is believed that a
private organization operating under the umbrella of an international
organization such as INTELSAT or INMARSAT might be the optimal choice
for a regional or global system. The legal and regulatory issues underlying the
establishment and operation of a national or global DBS-R system are
addressed in Section 5. Here, we make a few brief remarks concerning the
technical aspects of the organization that eventually has the responsibility for
the implementation and op_:ation of a domestic, regional, or global system.
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6.7.2
Organizationally, the key consideration is to ensure that management is
responsive to customer requirements, while remaining profitable. The
organizational question is whether the DBS-R customers are programmers or
listeners. Since the programmers' primary customers are the listeners, the
DBS-R operators' primary customers must be the programmers. This means
that the DBS-R operator should organize its business to identify and satisfy
the needs of radio programmers in a profitable manner.
Organizational Considerations for Market Penetration
The first step for the DBS-R operation from an organizational standpoint is to
identify its customers, both near-term and long-term. All subsequent
organizational steps should be based upon understanding and satisfying the
identified customer requirements. Figure 6-3 shows a DBS-R marketing
model based on the concept of incremental growth from a core business base.
Examining the model, it will be seen that the core customers are international
shortwave broadcasters, followed by domestic superstations (local urban radio
stations that want to go national via satellite), and finally specialized
programmers that are looking for broader audiences. Based on focus group
research with African broadcast specialists, examples of specific potential
customer identities in each of the three aforementioned customer categories
are shown for the African continent in Figure 6-4. It follows that the DBS-R
operator should structure its marketing and management effort to provide
maximum focus on international shortwave broadcasters, with some resources
devoted to leading urban radio broadcasters, and an outreach effort to
specialized programmers.
Organizational Considerations for Profitability
While identifying and satisfying market requirements, as described above, it
is also essential to accomplish this objective profitably in order to attract
capital for growth and business expansion. It was previously stated in
paragraph 6.4 that operating costs for a DBS-R system can be quantified as a
certain fraction of space segment costs. Hence, th_ key to profitability, after
market penetration, is to optimize capital spending on satellites, i.e., closely
matching the satellite capacity to near-term business projections.
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Figure 6-4
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Figure 6-5 provides a generic framework for DBS-R capital spending. The key
is to be able to flexibly deploy spacecraft to meet market demand, and to adapt
rapidly to changes in customer requirements. Not until a DBS-R business is
well underway, will it be possible to know whether a series of Lightsats, or a
single large satellite, is the right space segment development option. Hence,
the DBS-R organization must be structured with strong technical
management capabilities, and a tight feedback loop between technology and
marketing.
Business Prqiections
Business projections for DBS-R revolve around the following key numbers,
developed in this report, and a strategy for "seeding" the DBS-R market with a
sufficient number of satellite radio receivers to enable "self-propelled growth."
The key numbers are:
• Radio receiver set growth of 5, 10 or 20 million per year after self-propelled
growth commences;
• Capital outlay of $30-40 million per continent for initial service capability;
• Operating costs of $6-8 million per year per continent.
Seeding the Market to Achieve Self-Propelled Market Growth
After substantial discussion and research, the following steps are
recommended as the optimal approach to market seeding and self-propelled
market growth:
• Target 1 million radio sets globally as the take-off point for self-propelled
market growth;
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Figure 6-5
Framework for DBS-R Capital Spending
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Take affirmative steps to place about 100,000 radio sets in the hands of
"opinion leaders" -- community organizations or individuals to whom others
look for behavioral guidance;
Require the DBS-R operator to be responsible for ensuring the production
and distribution to opinion leaders of the first 100,000 radio sets per
continent;
Develop a funding algorithm which weans the DBS-R operator from any
kind of explicit or implicit radio receiver set subsidy.
D
m
n
The most straight forward means to ensure that the market is seeded with
DBS-R receiver sets is to make the production and distribution of such sets a
requirement of receiving international broadcaster orders for DBS-R channel
capacity. Since the international broadcasters are projected to be the primary
customers of DBS-R operators, they are likely to be responsive to this
requirement.
m
J
To make DBS-R radios available, without creating a subsidy-based distortion
of the market, the production and distribution requirement should follow these
guidelines:
• First third of radios are made available to qualified non-profit
organizations at no-cost;
• Second third of radios are made available to qualified non-profit or opinion-
leader organizations at 50% of cost;
• Last third of seed quantity radios are made available generally at cost.
Assuming the cost of each radio in a 100,000 quantity buy to be approximately
$100, the cost of this program to the DBS-R operator would be in the
neighborhood of $5 million. Hence, an international broadcaster request for
proposal (RFF) _or satellite capacity should include a requirement for
providing a seed quantity of radios, and should expect bids from this item in
the range of $5 million, in addition to hourly channel charges of around $200.
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Although these figures do not take into account the cost of capital to the DBS-R
operator, they also ignore the countervailing benefit to the DBS-R operator of a
built-in market for all the other channels on the satellite system.
DBS-R Rate of Return
Capital investments are based on a comparison of perceived risk with expected
rate of return, in light of alternative opportunities and various qualitative
investment principles (e.g., pro- or anti-high-tech). In the financial markets of
the early 1990's, there are numerous investment opportunities available in
operating companies (i.e., with current revenues) with expected returns on
investment ranging from 20-35%. Many of these operating companies are not
currently profitable, but investors normally consider a non-profitable
operating company much less risky than a non-operating company (i.e., with
no revenues at all).
!n light of less risky alternatives offering a return on investment as high as
20%, a DBS-R project will like,y need to project measurably higher returns to
investors. The figure of up to 25% is suggested because investors believe
satellite-based projects are especially risky, due to much publicized launch
delays and rocket explosions. On the other hand, returns much above 50% are
rarely credible-- not because they are impossible, but because they require
almost everything in a business plan to "go right." In reality, most business
plans are continually revised and iterated to account for events that are not in
accordance with projections.
Quantitative Business Proiections
Provided in Table 6-5 are quantitative business projections assuming (a) the
market ramp-up model described earlier, (b) the operating cost data for staged
system, and (c) the market seeding requirements identified above.
DBS-R System Startup Considerations
In order to commence construction of a DBS-R system, it will be necessary for
the primary customers for such a system-- broadcasters -- to purchase
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TABLE 6-5
DBS-R SYSTEM BUSINESS PROJECTION
w
Year
Channels Launched (1)
Radio Sets in Use (2)
Channel Revenues (3)
Radio Set Sales (4)
Operating Expenses (5)
1995 2000 2005 2010
30 180 300 600
1Mil. 10Mil. 30Mil. 70Mil.
$30Mil. $180Mil. $300Mil. $600
Mil.
$50Mil. $1Bil. $3 Bil. $5Bil.
$24Mil. $112Mil. $202Mil. $480
Mil.
w
I
w
g
I
Notes:
1. Three lightsats during 1993-95, a fourth lightsat and a large capacity satellite
prior to 2000, three continent medium sats by 2005 and a global, high capacity
redundant system by 2010. All channel data cumulative.
I
m
.
o
Based on historical radio set growth rates. See Tables 6-1 and 6-2. All radio sets
data cumulative.
Assumes average selling price of $114 per channel hour, 100% duty cycle, or
$228 per channel hour, 50% of capacity idle.
W
I
.
.
Assume $5 million per 100,000 radios seeding policy initially, average retail
price of $100 per radio through 2005, $75 per radio thereafter, all figures in
constant 1990 dollars.
Data derived from accompanying text.
g
w
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channels on the system. Absent such purchase commitments, construction of a
DBS-R system by a private organization is unlikely. Nevertheless, as shown
in this report, DBS-R systems represent the best strategy for the international
broadcasters for the following reasons:
L
.[
L
L_
L
r
7 "
The inherent advantages of DBS-R technology over terrestrial radio
technology will prevent loss of listening audience due to dissatisfaction
with audio quality. Figure 6-6 shows a critical audience at risk because of
poor quality of SW broadcast.
The inherent costs of DBS-R technology are no greater, and in fact, are less
for international broadcasters than those of terrestrial radio technology.
The DBS-R costs progressively decrease as economies of scale are brought
to bear on systems to meet increasing global demands.
The "chicken and egg" dilemma of lack of satellite radio receiver sets can be
4.1._
m,_ion persolved with a rational"seeding" policy, costing nG more _,,_n $5 "_"
100,000 radios.
In order to financially move forward, international broadcasters will need to
develop and issue one or more RFPs for DBS-R channel capacity, delivered
working in orbit, and delivered in tandem with approximately 100,000
satellite radio receiver sets. Budgetary support for this approach will need to
be at least $35 million, which represents minimum DBS operator break even
point for the satellite plus funding for 100,000 satellite radio receiver sets. It is
likely that competitive responses to the RFP will be delivered within the
budget range. However, it may be prudent to seek budgetary support in the
neighborhood of approximately $100 million to fund proposals for coverage of
broader portions of the earth, and to provide a contingency in the event that
responses to the RFP are higher than this business plan anticipates.
The financial structure of the negotiated contract will need to be prepaid
channel ownership with milestone payments tied to satellite and radio
receiver sci. construction. Otherwise, the DBS-R operation will not be able to
fund the satellite construction. A fixed price plus incentive structure, with
milestone payments, will probably work best, with the international
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broadcaster owning outright its channel(s), and the DBS-R operator free to sell
and/or lease its remaining channels.
Figure 6-7 shows an implementation schedule for an international DBS-R
system.
The case for DBS-R system implementation could be made on the basis of
higher quality and broader coverage alone. However, it appears that the
DBS-R system has also the prospect of reducing broadcasting costs of
international broadcasters such as VOA. Higher quality coupled with lower
costs makes a strong case for NASA and VOA to actively foster and encourage
the implementation of private national, regional, and global DBS-R systems.
L
L--
w
m .
.x
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iFigure 6-7
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APPENDIX A
Acronyms and Abbreviations
i
A-1
m
m
AC
AM
ARABSAT
ASIC
AUS
BBC
CCIT
CD
CHR
DAT
DAB
dB
DBS-R
EIRP
EUTELSAT
FCC
FM
GHz
HI-FI
HR
INMARSAT
INTELSAT
ITU
Kbps
LeRC
LP
M
MSS
MW
NASA
O&M
RCI
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Adult Contemporary
Amplitude Modulation
Arab Satellite Consortium
Application Specific Integrated Circuit
Australia
British Broadcasting Corporation
Comite ConsultaifInternationale de
Telegraphique et Telephonique (International Telephone
and Telegraph Consultative Committee)
Compact Disc
Contemporary Hit Radio
Digital Audio Tape
Direct Audio Broadcast
Decibel
Direct Broadcast Satellite - Radio
Effective Isotzopic Radiated Power
European Telecommunications Satellite Organization
Federal Communications Commission
Frequency Modulation
Giga Hertz
High Fidelity
Hour
International Maritime Satellite Organization
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
International Telecommunications Union
Kilobits per second
Lewis Research Center (NASA)
Long Playing
Meter, Million
Mobile Satellite Service
Medium Wave
National Aeronautics & Spac= Administration
Operation and Maintenance
Radio Canada International
A-2
mw
w
w
g
m
u
w
i
m
m
u
I
m
u
J
W
J
RFI
SW
TV
UK
USA
VHF
VOA
WARC
Radio France International
Short Wave
Television
United Kingdom
United StatesofAmerica
Very High Frequency
Voice ofAmerica
World Administrative Radio Conference
A-3
NASA
National Ae,onautlCS and
Soace Administration
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